Patch "bpf: Fix to preserve reg parent/live fields when copying range info" has been added to the 5.15-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    bpf: Fix to preserve reg parent/live fields when copying range info

to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     bpf-fix-to-preserve-reg-parent-live-fields-when-copy.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.



commit 82416eefadb0653207e4c4f945f64a0337577217
Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Fri Jan 6 16:22:13 2023 +0200

    bpf: Fix to preserve reg parent/live fields when copying range info
    
    [ Upstream commit 71f656a50176915d6813751188b5758daa8d012b ]
    
    Register range information is copied in several places. The intent is
    to transfer range/id information from one register/stack spill to
    another. Currently this is done using direct register assignment, e.g.:
    
    static void find_equal_scalars(..., struct bpf_reg_state *known_reg)
    {
            ...
            struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
            ...
                            *reg = *known_reg;
            ...
    }
    
    However, such assignments also copy the following bpf_reg_state fields:
    
    struct bpf_reg_state {
            ...
            struct bpf_reg_state *parent;
            ...
            enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
            ...
    };
    
    Copying of these fields is accidental and incorrect, as could be
    demonstrated by the following example:
    
         0: call ktime_get_ns()
         1: r6 = r0
         2: call ktime_get_ns()
         3: r7 = r0
         4: if r0 > r6 goto +1             ; r0 & r6 are unbound thus generated
                                           ; branch states are identical
         5: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef ; 64-bit write to fp[-8]
        --- checkpoint ---
         6: r1 = 42                        ; r1 marked as written
         7: *(u8 *)(r10 - 8) = r1          ; 8-bit write, fp[-8] parent & live
                                           ; overwritten
         8: r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8)
         9: r0 = 0
        10: exit
    
    This example is unsafe because 64-bit write to fp[-8] at (5) is
    conditional, thus not all bytes of fp[-8] are guaranteed to be set
    when it is read at (8). However, currently the example passes
    verification.
    
    First, the execution path 1-10 is examined by verifier.
    Suppose that a new checkpoint is created by is_state_visited() at (6).
    After checkpoint creation:
    - r1.parent points to checkpoint.r1,
    - fp[-8].parent points to checkpoint.fp[-8].
    At (6) the r1.live is set to REG_LIVE_WRITTEN.
    At (7) the fp[-8].parent is set to r1.parent and fp[-8].live is set to
    REG_LIVE_WRITTEN, because of the following code called in
    check_stack_write_fixed_off():
    
    static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
                                    int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
                                    int size)
    {
            ...
            state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;  // <--- parent & live copied
            if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
                    state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
            ...
    }
    
    Note the intent to mark stack spill as written only if 8 bytes are
    spilled to a slot, however this intent is spoiled by a 'live' field copy.
    At (8) the checkpoint.fp[-8] should be marked as REG_LIVE_READ but
    this does not happen:
    - fp[-8] in a current state is already marked as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
    - fp[-8].parent points to checkpoint.r1, parentage chain is used by
      mark_reg_read() to mark checkpoint states.
    At (10) the verification is finished for path 1-10 and jump 4-6 is
    examined. The checkpoint.fp[-8] never gets REG_LIVE_READ mark and this
    spill is pruned from the cached states by clean_live_states(). Hence
    verifier state obtained via path 1-4,6 is deemed identical to one
    obtained via path 1-6 and program marked as safe.
    
    Note: the example should be executed with BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag
    set to force creation of intermediate verifier states.
    
    This commit revisits the locations where bpf_reg_state instances are
    copied and replaces the direct copies with a call to a function
    copy_register_state(dst, src) that preserves 'parent' and 'live'
    fields of the 'dst'.
    
    Fixes: 679c782de14b ("bpf/verifier: per-register parent pointers")
    Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230106142214.1040390-2-eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx
    Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index d2ccf7725e73..1c89c25327c8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2613,13 +2613,24 @@ static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
 	return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
 }
 
+/* Copy src state preserving dst->parent and dst->live fields */
+static void copy_register_state(struct bpf_reg_state *dst, const struct bpf_reg_state *src)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *parent = dst->parent;
+	enum bpf_reg_liveness live = dst->live;
+
+	*dst = *src;
+	dst->parent = parent;
+	dst->live = live;
+}
+
 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
 				int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 				int size)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr = *reg;
+	copy_register_state(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, reg);
 	if (size == BPF_REG_SIZE)
 		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 
@@ -2945,7 +2956,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				 */
 				s32 subreg_def = state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def;
 
-				state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
+				copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
 				state->regs[dst_regno].subreg_def = subreg_def;
 			} else {
 				for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
@@ -2972,7 +2983,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 		if (dst_regno >= 0) {
 			/* restore register state from stack */
-			state->regs[dst_regno] = *reg;
+			copy_register_state(&state->regs[dst_regno], reg);
 			/* mark reg as written since spilled pointer state likely
 			 * has its liveness marks cleared by is_state_visited()
 			 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
@@ -6904,7 +6915,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	 */
 	if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
 		tmp = *dst_reg;
-		*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
+		copy_register_state(dst_reg, ptr_reg);
 	}
 	ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
 					env->insn_idx);
@@ -8160,7 +8171,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 					 * to propagate min/max range.
 					 */
 					src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
-				*dst_reg = *src_reg;
+				copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
 				dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
 				dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
 			} else {
@@ -8171,7 +8182,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 						insn->src_reg);
 					return -EACCES;
 				} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
-					*dst_reg = *src_reg;
+					copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
 					/* Make sure ID is cleared otherwise
 					 * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
 					 * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
@@ -8967,7 +8978,7 @@ static void find_equal_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
 
 	bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(vstate, state, reg, ({
 		if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && reg->id == known_reg->id)
-			*reg = *known_reg;
+			copy_register_state(reg, known_reg);
 	}));
 }
 



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