This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From stable-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Thu Nov 17 10:21:17 2022
From: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:19:31 +0900
Subject: x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation
To: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx, kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, bp@xxxxxxxxx, pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx, peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx, cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, surajjs@xxxxxxxxxx, ssouhlal@xxxxxxxxxxx, suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx
Message-ID: <20221117091952.1940850-14-suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx>
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream.
Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB
underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware.
Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than
UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET
itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means
IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET.
Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, skip_r11rcx]
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR]
[cascardo: entry fixups because of missing UNTRAIN_RET]
[cascardo: conflicts on fsgsbase]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 29 +++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 11 ++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 -
4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
@@ -309,6 +311,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
#endif
/*
+ * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.
+ *
+ * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers
+ * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET
+ * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)
+ *
+ * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,
+ * which is used on the paranoid paths.
+ *
+ * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+ rdmsr
+ shl $32, %rdx
+ or %rdx, %rax
+ mov %rax, \save_reg
+ test $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax
+ jz .Ldo_wrmsr_\@
+ lfence
+ jmp .Lend_\@
+.Ldo_wrmsr_\@:
+.endif
+
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+ movl %edx, %eax
+ shr $32, %rdx
+ wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)
+ * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+ movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+ mov \save_reg, %rdx
+.else
+ movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+ andl $(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx
+.endif
+
+ movl %edx, %eax
+ shr $32, %rdx
+ wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
* Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
*
* FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -235,6 +235,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
/* IRQs are off. */
movq %rax, %rdi
movq %rsp, %rsi
+
+ /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */
+ IBRS_ENTER
+
call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ /* we're about to change IF */
@@ -311,6 +315,7 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
* perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
*/
syscall_return_via_sysret:
+ IBRS_EXIT
POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
/*
@@ -684,6 +689,7 @@ GLOBAL(retint_user)
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+ IBRS_EXIT
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1249,7 +1255,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
*/
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
- ret
+ /*
+ * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like
+ * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register.
+ */
+ IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
+
+ RET
END(paranoid_entry)
/*
@@ -1277,12 +1289,20 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
jmp .Lparanoid_exit_restore
.Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
+
+ /*
+ * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access
+ * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable.
+ */
+ IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
.Lparanoid_exit_restore:
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
END(paranoid_exit)
+
/*
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
*/
@@ -1302,6 +1322,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ IBRS_ENTER
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
@@ -1366,6 +1387,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
SWAPGS
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+ IBRS_ENTER
/*
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1471,6 +1493,8 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx)
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+ IBRS_ENTER
+
/*
* At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
* due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
@@ -1694,6 +1718,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
movq $-1, %rsi
call do_nmi
+ /* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */
+ IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
*
* Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
*/
-#include "calling.h"
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "calling.h"
+
.section .entry.text, "ax"
/*
@@ -106,6 +107,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
xorl %r15d, %r15d /* nospec r15 */
cld
+ IBRS_ENTER
+
/*
* SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
* ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
@@ -253,6 +256,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwfram
*/
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+ IBRS_ENTER
+
movq %rsp, %rdi
call do_fast_syscall_32
/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
@@ -262,6 +267,9 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwfram
/* Opportunistic SYSRET */
sysret32_from_system_call:
TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
+
+ IBRS_EXIT
+
movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
@@ -403,6 +411,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
* gate turned them off.
*/
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+ IBRS_ENTER
movq %rsp, %rdi
call do_int80_syscall_32
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stable-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-disable-rrsba-behavior.patch
queue-4.19/revert-x86-speculation-add-rsb-vm-exit-protections.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-vmx-fix-ibrs-handling-after-vmexit.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-vmx-prevent-guest-rsb-poisoning-attacks-with-eibrs.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpufeature-add-facility-to-check-for-min-microcode-revisions.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-keep-a-per-cpu-ia32_spec_ctrl-value.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpu-amd-enumerate-btc_no.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fix-firmware-entry-spec_ctrl-handling.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-add-spectre_v2-ibrs-option-to-support-kernel-ibrs.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpu-add-consistent-cpu-match-macros.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-remove-x86_spec_ctrl_mask.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-add-cannon-lake-to-retbleed-affected-cpu-list.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-warn-when-ibrs-mitigation-is-selected-on-enhanced-ibrs-parts.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fill-rsb-on-vmexit-for-ibrs.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpu-add-a-steppings-field-to-struct-x86_cpu_id.patch
queue-4.19/x86-common-stamp-out-the-stepping-madness.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-split-spectre_v2_select_mitigation-and-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-report-intel-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-change-fill_return_buffer-to-work-with-objtool.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpufeatures-move-retpoline-flags-to-word-11.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fix-spec_ctrl-write-on-smt-state-change.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-optimize-spec_ctrl-msr-writes.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-report-amd-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpufeature-fix-various-quality-problems-in-the-asm-cpu_device_hd.h-header.patch
queue-4.19/intel_idle-disable-ibrs-during-long-idle.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-use-declare_per_cpu-for-x86_spec_ctrl_current.patch
queue-4.19/x86-entry-remove-skip_r11rcx.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-use-cached-host-spec_ctrl-value-for-guest-entry-exit.patch
queue-4.19/x86-devicetable-move-x86-specific-macro-out-of-generic-code.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-add-amd-retbleed-boot-parameter.patch
queue-4.19/x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch
queue-4.19/revert-x86-cpu-add-a-steppings-field-to-struct-x86_cpu_id.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-add-rsb-vm-exit-protections.patch
