This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-speculation-disable-rrsba-behavior.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From stable-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Thu Nov 17 10:22:53 2022
From: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:19:49 +0900
Subject: x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
To: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx, kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, bp@xxxxxxxxx, pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx, peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx, cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, surajjs@xxxxxxxxxx, ssouhlal@xxxxxxxxxxx, suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx
Message-ID: <20221117091952.1940850-32-suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx>
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream.
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 5.15: adjust context in scattered.c]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[sam: Fixed for missing X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB context]
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
/* FREE! (11*32+ 8) */
/* FREE! (11*32+ 9) */
/* FREE! (11*32+10) */
-/* FREE! (11*32+11) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL (11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -121,6 +123,13 @@
* bit available to control VERW
* behavior.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA BIT(19) /*
+ * Indicates RET may use predictors
+ * other than the RSB. With eIBRS
+ * enabled predictions in kernel mode
+ * are restricted to targets in
+ * kernel.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1181,6 +1181,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init
return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
}
+/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
+static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ }
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -1274,6 +1290,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and
+ * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
+ * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
+ */
+ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+ spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from stable-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-disable-rrsba-behavior.patch
queue-4.19/revert-x86-speculation-add-rsb-vm-exit-protections.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-vmx-fix-ibrs-handling-after-vmexit.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-vmx-prevent-guest-rsb-poisoning-attacks-with-eibrs.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpufeature-add-facility-to-check-for-min-microcode-revisions.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-keep-a-per-cpu-ia32_spec_ctrl-value.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpu-amd-enumerate-btc_no.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fix-firmware-entry-spec_ctrl-handling.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-add-spectre_v2-ibrs-option-to-support-kernel-ibrs.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpu-add-consistent-cpu-match-macros.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-remove-x86_spec_ctrl_mask.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-add-cannon-lake-to-retbleed-affected-cpu-list.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-warn-when-ibrs-mitigation-is-selected-on-enhanced-ibrs-parts.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fill-rsb-on-vmexit-for-ibrs.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpu-add-a-steppings-field-to-struct-x86_cpu_id.patch
queue-4.19/x86-common-stamp-out-the-stepping-madness.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-split-spectre_v2_select_mitigation-and-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-report-intel-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-change-fill_return_buffer-to-work-with-objtool.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpufeatures-move-retpoline-flags-to-word-11.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fix-spec_ctrl-write-on-smt-state-change.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-optimize-spec_ctrl-msr-writes.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-report-amd-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch
queue-4.19/x86-cpufeature-fix-various-quality-problems-in-the-asm-cpu_device_hd.h-header.patch
queue-4.19/intel_idle-disable-ibrs-during-long-idle.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-use-declare_per_cpu-for-x86_spec_ctrl_current.patch
queue-4.19/x86-entry-remove-skip_r11rcx.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-use-cached-host-spec_ctrl-value-for-guest-entry-exit.patch
queue-4.19/x86-devicetable-move-x86-specific-macro-out-of-generic-code.patch
queue-4.19/x86-bugs-add-amd-retbleed-boot-parameter.patch
queue-4.19/x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch
queue-4.19/revert-x86-cpu-add-a-steppings-field-to-struct-x86_cpu_id.patch
queue-4.19/x86-speculation-add-rsb-vm-exit-protections.patch
