This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
x86-speculation-remove-x86_spec_ctrl_mask.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From foo@baz Mon Oct 31 07:55:50 AM CET 2022
From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 13:55:23 -0700
Subject: x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
To: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <surajjs@xxxxxxxxxx>, <sjitindarsingh@xxxxxxxxx>, <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>, <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>, <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <x86@xxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID: <20221027205523.17741-4-surajjs@xxxxxxxxxx>
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
commit acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 upstream.
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +------------------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -84,12 +84,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
/*
- * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
- * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
- */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-
-/*
* AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
* x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
*/
@@ -137,10 +131,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
- /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
@@ -198,19 +188,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
- u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
+ u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
- /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
- /*
- * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
- * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
- * modifiable bits from the guest value.
- */
- guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
- guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-
if (hostval != guestval) {
msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -1541,16 +1522,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
}
/*
- * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
- * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
- * case where the host does not enable it.
- */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
- }
-
- /*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from surajjs@xxxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-disable-rrsba-behavior.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-report-intel-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-4.14/x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-warn-when-ibrs-mitigation-is-selected-on-enhanced-ibrs-parts.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu-add-a-steppings-field-to-struct-x86_cpu_id.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-fix-spec_ctrl-write-on-smt-state-change.patch
queue-4.14/entel_idle-disable-ibrs-during-long-idle.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-cached-host-spec_ctrl-value-for-guest-entry-exit.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-change-fill_return_buffer-to-work-with-objtool.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-add-lfence-to-rsb-fill-sequence.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-report-amd-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-add-spectre_v2-ibrs-option-to-support-kernel-ibrs.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-keep-a-per-cpu-ia32_spec_ctrl-value.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-fill-rsb-on-vmexit-for-ibrs.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-add-rsb-vm-exit-protections.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-optimize-spec_ctrl-msr-writes.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-vmx-fix-ibrs-handling-after-vmexit.patch
queue-4.14/kvm-vmx-prevent-guest-rsb-poisoning-attacks-with-eibrs.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-fix-firmware-entry-spec_ctrl-handling.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-add-amd-retbleed-boot-parameter.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu-add-consistent-cpu-match-macros.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-remove-x86_spec_ctrl_mask.patch
queue-4.14/x86-speculation-use-declare_per_cpu-for-x86_spec_ctrl_current.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpufeature-fix-various-quality-problems-in-the-asm-cpu_device_hd.h-header.patch
queue-4.14/x86-entry-remove-skip_r11rcx.patch
queue-4.14/revert-x86-cpu-add-a-steppings-field-to-struct-x86_cpu_id.patch
queue-4.14/x86-common-stamp-out-the-stepping-madness.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpu-amd-enumerate-btc_no.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-add-cannon-lake-to-retbleed-affected-cpu-list.patch
queue-4.14/x86-devicetable-move-x86-specific-macro-out-of-generic-code.patch
queue-4.14/x86-bugs-split-spectre_v2_select_mitigation-and-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpufeatures-move-retpoline-flags-to-word-11.patch
queue-4.14/x86-cpufeature-add-facility-to-check-for-min-microcode-revisions.patch
