This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points to the 5.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: x86-xen-rename-sys-entry-points.patch and it can be found in the queue-5.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Jul 12 05:03:58 PM CEST 2022 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:00 +0200 Subject: x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 upstream. Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 20 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature)) return; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat); if(ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature); } @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) { int ret; - ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64); if (ret != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret); /* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) { ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32, - xen_syscall32_target); + xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat); if (ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32); } --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_retu */ /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR popq %rcx @@ -249,12 +249,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR popq %rcx @@ -269,10 +269,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR /* @@ -291,19 +291,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp) jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) #else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY ENDBR lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax pushq $0 jmp hypercall_iret -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) #endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ /* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */ extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[]; -void xen_sysenter_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -void xen_syscall_target(void); -void xen_syscall32_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void); #endif extern void *xen_initial_gdt; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are queue-5.18/x86-sev-avoid-using-__x86_return_thunk.patch queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-prevent-rsb-underflow-before-vmenter.patch queue-5.18/x86-ftrace-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch queue-5.18/objtool-re-add-unwind_hint_-save_restore.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-add-retbleed-ibpb.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-enable-stibp-for-jmp2ret.patch queue-5.18/x86-retpoline-cleanup-some-ifdefery.patch queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-flatten-__vmx_vcpu_run.patch queue-5.18/x86-kvm-vmx-make-noinstr-clean.patch queue-5.18/x86-retbleed-add-fine-grained-kconfig-knobs.patch queue-5.18/x86-cpu-amd-add-spectral-chicken.patch queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-fix-ibrs-handling-after-vmexit.patch queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-prevent-guest-rsb-poisoning-attacks-with-eibrs.patch queue-5.18/x86-vsyscall_emu-64-don-t-use-ret-in-vsyscall-emulation.patch queue-5.18/x86-add-magic-amd-return-thunk.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-keep-a-per-cpu-ia32_spec_ctrl-value.patch queue-5.18/x86-objtool-create-.return_sites.patch queue-5.18/x86-kvm-fix-setcc-emulation-for-return-thunks.patch queue-5.18/x86-retpoline-swizzle-retpoline-thunk.patch queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fix-firmware-entry-spec_ctrl-handling.patch queue-5.18/x86-speculation-add-spectre_v2-ibrs-option-to-support-kernel-ibrs.patch queue-5.18/x86-xen-add-untrain_ret.patch queue-5.18/x86-undo-return-thunk-damage.patch queue-5.18/x86-entry-avoid-very-early-ret.patch queue-5.18/x86-entry-move-push_and_clear_regs-back-into-error_entry.patch queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fill-rsb-on-vmexit-for-ibrs.patch queue-5.18/objtool-add-entry-unret-validation.patch queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-convert-launched-argument-to-flags.patch queue-5.18/x86-bpf-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch queue-5.18/x86-common-stamp-out-the-stepping-madness.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-split-spectre_v2_select_mitigation-and-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-report-intel-retbleed-vulnerability.patch queue-5.18/x86-cpufeatures-move-retpoline-flags-to-word-11.patch queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fix-spec_ctrl-write-on-smt-state-change.patch queue-5.18/x86-retpoline-use-mfunction-return.patch queue-5.18/x86-xen-rename-sys-entry-points.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-optimize-spec_ctrl-msr-writes.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-report-amd-retbleed-vulnerability.patch queue-5.18/x86-static_call-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch queue-5.18/x86-use-return-thunk-in-asm-code.patch queue-5.18/intel_idle-disable-ibrs-during-long-idle.patch queue-5.18/x86-entry-remove-skip_r11rcx.patch queue-5.18/x86-speculation-use-cached-host-spec_ctrl-value-for-guest-entry-exit.patch queue-5.18/x86-bugs-add-amd-retbleed-boot-parameter.patch queue-5.18/x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch queue-5.18/objtool-treat-.text.__x86.-as-noinstr.patch queue-5.18/objtool-update-retpoline-validation.patch