Patch "objtool: Update Retpoline validation" has been added to the 5.18-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    objtool: Update Retpoline validation

to the 5.18-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     objtool-update-retpoline-validation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.18 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.


>From foo@baz Tue Jul 12 05:03:58 PM CEST 2022
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:15:59 +0200
Subject: objtool: Update Retpoline validation

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f upstream.

Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of
not having bare naked RET instructions.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S       |    2 ++
 arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S              |    1 +
 tools/objtool/check.c                |   19 +++++++++++++------
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -76,6 +76,12 @@
 .endm
 
 /*
+ * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
+ * vs RETBleed validation.
+ */
+#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+
+/*
  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
  * attack.
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_encrypt_execute)
 	pop	%rbp
 
 	/* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */
+	ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
 	ret
 	int3
 SYM_FUNC_END(sme_encrypt_execute)
@@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__enc_copy)
 	pop	%r15
 
 	/* Offset to __x86_return_thunk would be wrong here */
+	ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
 	ret
 	int3
 .L__enc_copy_end:
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(hypercall_page)
 	.rept (PAGE_SIZE / 32)
 		UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 		ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+		ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
 		ret
 		/*
 		 * Xen will write the hypercall page, and sort out ENDBR.
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -2114,8 +2114,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct o
 		}
 
 		if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
-		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) {
-			WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call",
+		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
+		    insn->type != INSN_RETURN) {
+			WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret",
 				  insn->sec, insn->offset);
 			return -1;
 		}
@@ -3648,7 +3649,8 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
 
 	for_each_insn(file, insn) {
 		if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
-		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC)
+		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
+		    insn->type != INSN_RETURN)
 			continue;
 
 		if (insn->retpoline_safe)
@@ -3663,9 +3665,14 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
 		if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !module)
 			continue;
 
-		WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
-			  insn->sec, insn->offset,
-			  insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
+		if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) {
+			WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build",
+				  insn->sec, insn->offset);
+		} else {
+			WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
+				  insn->sec, insn->offset,
+				  insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
+		}
 
 		warnings++;
 	}


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx are

queue-5.18/x86-sev-avoid-using-__x86_return_thunk.patch
queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-prevent-rsb-underflow-before-vmenter.patch
queue-5.18/x86-ftrace-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch
queue-5.18/objtool-re-add-unwind_hint_-save_restore.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-add-retbleed-ibpb.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-enable-stibp-for-jmp2ret.patch
queue-5.18/x86-retpoline-cleanup-some-ifdefery.patch
queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-flatten-__vmx_vcpu_run.patch
queue-5.18/x86-kvm-vmx-make-noinstr-clean.patch
queue-5.18/x86-retbleed-add-fine-grained-kconfig-knobs.patch
queue-5.18/x86-cpu-amd-add-spectral-chicken.patch
queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-fix-ibrs-handling-after-vmexit.patch
queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-prevent-guest-rsb-poisoning-attacks-with-eibrs.patch
queue-5.18/x86-vsyscall_emu-64-don-t-use-ret-in-vsyscall-emulation.patch
queue-5.18/x86-add-magic-amd-return-thunk.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-keep-a-per-cpu-ia32_spec_ctrl-value.patch
queue-5.18/x86-objtool-create-.return_sites.patch
queue-5.18/x86-kvm-fix-setcc-emulation-for-return-thunks.patch
queue-5.18/x86-retpoline-swizzle-retpoline-thunk.patch
queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fix-firmware-entry-spec_ctrl-handling.patch
queue-5.18/x86-speculation-add-spectre_v2-ibrs-option-to-support-kernel-ibrs.patch
queue-5.18/x86-xen-add-untrain_ret.patch
queue-5.18/x86-undo-return-thunk-damage.patch
queue-5.18/x86-entry-avoid-very-early-ret.patch
queue-5.18/x86-entry-move-push_and_clear_regs-back-into-error_entry.patch
queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fill-rsb-on-vmexit-for-ibrs.patch
queue-5.18/objtool-add-entry-unret-validation.patch
queue-5.18/kvm-vmx-convert-launched-argument-to-flags.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bpf-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch
queue-5.18/x86-common-stamp-out-the-stepping-madness.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-split-spectre_v2_select_mitigation-and-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-report-intel-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-5.18/x86-cpufeatures-move-retpoline-flags-to-word-11.patch
queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fix-spec_ctrl-write-on-smt-state-change.patch
queue-5.18/x86-retpoline-use-mfunction-return.patch
queue-5.18/x86-xen-rename-sys-entry-points.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-optimize-spec_ctrl-msr-writes.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-report-amd-retbleed-vulnerability.patch
queue-5.18/x86-static_call-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch
queue-5.18/x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch
queue-5.18/x86-use-return-thunk-in-asm-code.patch
queue-5.18/intel_idle-disable-ibrs-during-long-idle.patch
queue-5.18/x86-entry-remove-skip_r11rcx.patch
queue-5.18/x86-speculation-use-cached-host-spec_ctrl-value-for-guest-entry-exit.patch
queue-5.18/x86-bugs-add-amd-retbleed-boot-parameter.patch
queue-5.18/x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch
queue-5.18/objtool-treat-.text.__x86.-as-noinstr.patch
queue-5.18/objtool-update-retpoline-validation.patch



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