This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n to the 5.10-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch and it can be found in the queue-5.10 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Jul 12 05:07:35 PM CEST 2022 From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:05 +0200 Subject: x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream. If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be silently disabled. There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 2 -- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 -- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 6 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -782,7 +782,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -791,7 +790,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */ popfl --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE /* * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated @@ -258,7 +257,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm) * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW -#endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ popq %r15 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -122,11 +122,9 @@ * monstrosity above, manually. */ .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP) .Lskip_rsb_\@: -#endif .endm /* Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx are queue-5.10/x86-sev-avoid-using-__x86_return_thunk.patch queue-5.10/x86-ftrace-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch queue-5.10/objtool-re-add-unwind_hint_-save_restore.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-add-retbleed-ibpb.patch queue-5.10/x86-retpoline-cleanup-some-ifdefery.patch queue-5.10/kvm-vmx-flatten-__vmx_vcpu_run.patch queue-5.10/x86-cpu-amd-add-spectral-chicken.patch queue-5.10/kvm-vmx-fix-ibrs-handling-after-vmexit.patch queue-5.10/kvm-vmx-prevent-guest-rsb-poisoning-attacks-with-eibrs.patch queue-5.10/x86-vsyscall_emu-64-don-t-use-ret-in-vsyscall-emulation.patch queue-5.10/objtool-skip-non-text-sections-when-adding-return-thunk-sites.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-do-ibpb-fallback-check-only-once.patch queue-5.10/x86-add-magic-amd-return-thunk.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-keep-a-per-cpu-ia32_spec_ctrl-value.patch queue-5.10/x86-objtool-create-.return_sites.patch queue-5.10/x86-kvm-fix-setcc-emulation-for-return-thunks.patch queue-5.10/x86-retpoline-swizzle-retpoline-thunk.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-fix-firmware-entry-spec_ctrl-handling.patch queue-5.10/objtool-fix-symbol-creation.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-add-spectre_v2-ibrs-option-to-support-kernel-ibrs.patch queue-5.10/x86-undo-return-thunk-damage.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-remove-x86_spec_ctrl_mask.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-fill-rsb-on-vmexit-for-ibrs.patch queue-5.10/objtool-add-entry-unret-validation.patch queue-5.10/kvm-vmx-convert-launched-argument-to-flags.patch queue-5.10/x86-bpf-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-split-spectre_v2_select_mitigation-and-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-report-intel-retbleed-vulnerability.patch queue-5.10/x86-cpufeatures-move-retpoline-flags-to-word-11.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-fix-spec_ctrl-write-on-smt-state-change.patch queue-5.10/x86-retpoline-use-mfunction-return.patch queue-5.10/x86-xen-rename-sys-entry-points.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-optimize-spec_ctrl-msr-writes.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-report-amd-retbleed-vulnerability.patch queue-5.10/x86-static_call-use-alternative-ret-encoding.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-fix-rsb-filling-with-config_retpoline-n.patch queue-5.10/x86-use-return-thunk-in-asm-code.patch queue-5.10/intel_idle-disable-ibrs-during-long-idle.patch queue-5.10/x86-speculation-use-cached-host-spec_ctrl-value-for-guest-entry-exit.patch queue-5.10/x86-bugs-add-amd-retbleed-boot-parameter.patch queue-5.10/x86-entry-add-kernel-ibrs-implementation.patch queue-5.10/objtool-treat-.text.__x86.-as-noinstr.patch queue-5.10/objtool-update-retpoline-validation.patch