This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()
to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
random-do-not-use-batches-when-crng_ready.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From foo@baz Fri Jun 17 08:58:56 AM CEST 2022
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 14:14:32 +0200
Subject: random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
commit cbe89e5a375a51bbb952929b93fa973416fea74e upstream.
It's too hard to keep the batches synchronized, and pointless anyway,
since in !crng_ready(), we're updating the base_crng key really often,
where batching only hurts. So instead, if the crng isn't ready, just
call into get_random_bytes(). At this stage nothing is performance
critical anyhow.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -233,10 +233,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
*
*********************************************************************/
-enum {
- CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ,
- CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE
-};
+enum { CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ };
static struct {
u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
@@ -258,6 +255,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs
/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+/* Used by crng_make_state() to extract a new seed when crng_init==0. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
/*
* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a
@@ -382,17 +381,20 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
/*
* For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
* then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
- * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
- * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init.
+ * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+ * when crng_init==0.
*/
if (!crng_ready()) {
bool ready;
spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
ready = crng_ready();
- if (!ready)
+ if (!ready) {
+ if (crng_init == 0)
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
random_data, random_data_len);
+ }
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
if (!ready)
return;
@@ -433,50 +435,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-/*
- * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly
- * into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is,
- * generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early
- * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than
- * nothing.
- *
- * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented.
- * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),
- * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
- * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).
- */
-static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
-{
- static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
- struct blake2s_state hash;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- return;
- }
-
- blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
- blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);
- blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
-
- if (account) {
- crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);
- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- ++base_crng.generation;
- crng_init = 1;
- }
- }
-
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-
- if (crng_init == 1)
- pr_notice("fast init done\n");
-}
-
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
@@ -622,6 +580,11 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
local_irq_save(flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
@@ -655,6 +618,11 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
local_irq_save(flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
@@ -776,7 +744,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
enum {
POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
- POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
+ POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* No point in settling for less. */
+ POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS = POOL_MIN_BITS / 2
};
/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */
@@ -813,24 +782,6 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
-static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
-{
- unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
-
- if (!nbits)
- return;
-
- add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
- do {
- orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
- entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
- } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
-
- if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
- crng_reseed();
-}
-
/*
* This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
* as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
@@ -896,6 +847,33 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
return true;
}
+static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+{
+ unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!nbits)
+ return;
+
+ add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
+
+ do {
+ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+ entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
+
+ if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
+ crng_reseed();
+ else if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy_count >= POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS)) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (crng_init == 0) {
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_init = 1;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ }
+}
+
/**********************************************************************
*
@@ -938,9 +916,9 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
* entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
* block until more entropy is needed.
*
- * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or
- * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration
- * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*
* add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
* inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
@@ -1020,9 +998,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b
unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
unsigned long flags;
- if (crng_init == 0 && size)
- crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false);
-
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
@@ -1138,12 +1113,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk
void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
size_t entropy)
{
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) {
- crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);
- mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
- return;
- }
-
/*
* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
* We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
@@ -1151,7 +1120,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const vo
* CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
*/
wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
- !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
+ kthread_should_stop() ||
input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
@@ -1160,17 +1129,14 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const vo
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
/*
- * Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
- * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
- * it would be regarded as device data.
- * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*/
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
if (trust_bootloader)
- add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
- else
- add_device_randomness(buf, size);
+ credit_entropy_bits(size * 8);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
@@ -1270,13 +1236,8 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(str
fast_pool->last = jiffies;
local_irq_enable();
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true);
- mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
- } else {
- mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
- credit_entropy_bits(1);
- }
+ mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ credit_entropy_bits(1);
memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
}
@@ -1298,8 +1259,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
return;
- if (new_count < 64 && (!time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ) ||
- unlikely(crng_init == 0)))
+ if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
return;
if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from Jason@xxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.19/random-do-not-take-pool-spinlock-at-boot.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold.patch
queue-4.19/random-simplify-arithmetic-function-flow-in-account.patch
queue-4.19/random-order-timer-entropy-functions-below-interrupt-functions.patch
queue-4.19/random-introduce-drain_entropy-helper-to-declutter-crng_reseed.patch
queue-4.19/random-fix-locking-in-crng_fast_load.patch
queue-4.19/random-cleanup-uuid-handling.patch
queue-4.19/random-group-userspace-read-write-functions.patch
queue-4.19/random-make-credit_entropy_bits-always-safe.patch
queue-4.19/latent_entropy-avoid-build-error-when-plugin-cflags-are-not-set.patch
queue-4.19/revert-hwrng-core-freeze-khwrng-thread-during-suspend.patch
queue-4.19/drivers-char-random.c-make-primary_crng-static.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-re-init-if-crng_reseed-completes-before-primary-init.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-proper-jiffies-comparison-macro.patch
queue-4.19/init-call-time_init-before-rand_initialize.patch
queue-4.19/random-split-primary-secondary-crng-init-paths.patch
queue-4.19/random-pull-add_hwgenerator_randomness-declaration-into-random.h.patch
queue-4.19/random-unify-early-init-crng-load-accounting.patch
queue-4.19/drivers-char-random.c-remove-unused-stuct-poolinfo-poolbits.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-blake2s-instead-of-sha1-in-extraction.patch
queue-4.19/random-convert-to-using-fops-write_iter.patch
queue-4.19/random-initialize-chacha20-constants-with-correct-endianness.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-incomplete-last_data-logic.patch
queue-4.19/random-group-entropy-extraction-functions.patch
queue-4.19/random-add-proper-spdx-header.patch
queue-4.19/linux-random.h-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.19/random-rewrite-header-introductory-comment.patch
queue-4.19/random-make-dev-random-be-almost-like-dev-urandom.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-ifdef-d-out-interrupt-bench.patch
queue-4.19/um-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/lib-crypto-sha1-re-roll-loops-to-reduce-code-size.patch
queue-4.19/random-tie-batched-entropy-generation-to-base_crng-generation.patch
queue-4.19/sparc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-linear-min-entropy-accumulation-crediting.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-batched-entropy-locking.patch
queue-4.19/xtensa-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/powerpc-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.19/fdt-add-support-for-rng-seed.patch
queue-4.19/random-continually-use-hwgenerator-randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-access-input_pool_data-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch
queue-4.19/random-add-arch_get_random_-long_early.patch
queue-4.19/random-inline-leaves-of-rand_initialize.patch
queue-4.19/random-cleanup-poolinfo-abstraction.patch
queue-4.19/random-wire-up-fops-splice_-read-write-_iter.patch
queue-4.19/random-handle-latent-entropy-and-command-line-from-random_init.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-use_input_pool-parameter-from-crng_reseed.patch
queue-4.19/random-credit-architectural-init-the-exact-amount.patch
queue-4.19/ia64-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.19/random-replace-custom-notifier-chain-with-standard-one.patch
queue-4.19/random-support-freezable-kthreads-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-document-get_random_int-family.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-the-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.19/random-avoid-initializing-twice-in-credit-race.patch
queue-4.19/random-avoid-warnings-for-config_numa-builds.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-add-fips-140-2-ctrng-for-noise-source.patch
queue-4.19/random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch
queue-4.19/random-zero-buffer-after-reading-entropy-from-userspace.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-whitespace-and-reorder-includes.patch
queue-4.19/random-ignore-grnd_random-in-getentropy-2.patch
queue-4.19/random-clear-fast-pool-crng-and-batches-in-cpuhp-bring-up.patch
queue-4.19/random-document-add_hwgenerator_randomness-with-other-input-functions.patch
queue-4.19/random-fix-typo-in-add_timer_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-crng-pre-init-loading-in-worker-rather-than-irq.patch
queue-4.19/powerpc-use-bool-in-archrandom.h.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-split-fast-init-input-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/timekeeping-add-raw-clock-fallback-for-random_get_entropy.patch
queue-4.19/random-early-initialization-of-chacha-constants.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-prepare-for-more-fine-grained-tracking-of-seeding-state.patch
queue-4.19/random-delete-code-to-pull-data-into-pools.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-always-try-to-free-jitter-rng-instance.patch
queue-4.19/random-simplify-entropy-debiting.patch
queue-4.19/random-don-t-reset-crng_init_cnt-on-urandom_read.patch
queue-4.19/random-skip-fast_init-if-hwrng-provides-large-chunk-of-entropy.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-siphash-as-interrupt-entropy-accumulator.patch
queue-4.19/random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
queue-4.19/random-fix-soft-lockup-when-trying-to-read-from-an-uninitialized-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.19/random-group-sysctl-functions.patch
queue-4.19/random-don-t-let-644-read-only-sysctls-be-written-to.patch
queue-4.19/random-document-crng_fast_key_erasure-destination-possibility.patch
queue-4.19/random-only-wake-up-writers-after-zap-if-threshold-was-passed.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-wait_event_freezable-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-check-for-signal-and-try-earlier-when-generating-entropy.patch
queue-4.19/random-check-for-signals-every-page_size-chunk-of-dev-random.patch
queue-4.19/arm-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/random-absorb-fast-pool-into-input-pool-after-fast-load.patch
queue-4.19/random-give-sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed-a-more-sensible-value.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-blake2s-generic-c-library-implementation-and-selftest.patch
queue-4.19/random-cleanup-fractional-entropy-shift-constants.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-rdseed-instead-of-rdrand-in-entropy-extraction.patch
queue-4.19/random-move-rand_initialize-earlier.patch
queue-4.19/random-don-t-wake-crng_init_wait-when-crng_init-1.patch
queue-4.19/random-add-a-urandom_read_nowait-for-random-apis-that-don-t-warn.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-sign-extend-bytes-for-rotation-when-mixing.patch
queue-4.19/random-move-initialization-functions-out-of-hot-pages.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-dead-code-left-over-from-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.19/drivers-char-random.c-constify-poolinfo_table.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-track-whether-drbg-was-seeded-with-rng_is_initialized.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-computational-hash-for-entropy-extraction.patch
queue-4.19/random-add-and-use-pr_fmt.patch
queue-4.19/random-round-robin-registers-as-ulong-not-u32.patch
queue-4.19/random-always-wake-up-entropy-writers-after-extraction.patch
queue-4.19/s390-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-xor-rdrand-when-writing-into-dev-random.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-make-reseeding-from-get_random_bytes-synchronous.patch
queue-4.19/random-convert-to-entropy_bits-for-better-code-readability.patch
queue-4.19/char-random-add-a-newline-at-the-end-of-the-file.patch
queue-4.19/random-move-randomize_page-into-mm-where-it-belongs.patch
queue-4.19/random-only-call-crng_finalize_init-for-primary_crng.patch
queue-4.19/random-cleanup-integer-types.patch
queue-4.19/random-re-add-removed-comment-about-get_random_-u32-u64-reseeding.patch
queue-4.19/random-unify-cycles_t-and-jiffies-usage-and-types.patch
queue-4.19/random-insist-on-random_get_entropy-existing-in-order-to-simplify.patch
queue-4.19/random-group-initialization-wait-functions.patch
queue-4.19/linux-random.h-mark-config_arch_random-functions-__must_check.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-unused-extract_entropy-reserved-argument.patch
queue-4.19/random-check-for-signal_pending-outside-of-need_resched-check.patch
queue-4.19/random-access-primary_pool-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch
queue-4.19/random-fix-sysctl-documentation-nits.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-unused-tracepoints.patch
queue-4.19/random-only-read-from-dev-random-after-its-pool-has-received-128-bits.patch
queue-4.19/nios2-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/random-treat-bootloader-trust-toggle-the-same-way-as-cpu-trust-toggle.patch
queue-4.19/random-make-consistent-usage-of-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.19/lib-crypto-blake2s-move-hmac-construction-into-wireguard.patch
queue-4.19/parisc-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.19/x86-tsc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/random-add-grnd_insecure-to-return-best-effort-non-cryptographic-bytes.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-move-dynamic-reseed_threshold-adjustments-to-__drbg_seed.patch
queue-4.19/random-check-for-signals-after-page-of-pool-writes.patch
queue-4.19/random-make-random_get_entropy-return-an-unsigned-long.patch
queue-4.19/random-check-for-crng_init-0-in-add_device_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-unnecessary-unlikely.patch
queue-4.19/random-defer-fast-pool-mixing-to-worker.patch
queue-4.19/random-harmonize-crng-init-done-messages.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-blake2s-include-linux-bug.h-instead-of-asm-bug.h.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-static-branch-for-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.19/random-rather-than-entropy_store-abstraction-use-global.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-extern-from-functions-in-header.patch
queue-4.19/siphash-use-one-source-of-truth-for-siphash-permutations.patch
queue-4.19/random-group-entropy-collection-functions.patch
queue-4.19/random-de-duplicate-input_pool-constants.patch
queue-4.19/random-mix-build-time-latent-entropy-into-pool-at-init.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-useless-header-comment.patch
queue-4.19/linux-random.h-use-false-with-bool.patch
queue-4.19/maintainers-co-maintain-random.c.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-outdated-int_max-6-check-in-urandom_read.patch
queue-4.19/m68k-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.19/alpha-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.19/random-mix-bootloader-randomness-into-pool.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-some-dead-code-of-poolinfo.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-use-batches-when-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-drbg-always-seeded-with-sp800-90b-compliant-noise-source.patch
queue-4.19/s390-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-pretend-to-handle-premature-next-security-model.patch
queue-4.19/random-avoid-arch_get_random_seed_long-when-collecting-irq-randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-is_enabled-config_numa-instead-of-ifdefs.patch
queue-4.19/random-avoid-superfluous-call-to-rdrand-in-crng-extraction.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-symbolic-constants-for-crng_init-states.patch
queue-4.19/random-reseed-more-often-immediately-after-booting.patch
queue-4.19/random-ensure-early-rdseed-goes-through-mixer-on-init.patch
queue-4.19/random-deobfuscate-irq-u32-u64-contributions.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-use-input-pool-from-hard-irqs.patch
queue-4.19/random-help-compiler-out-with-fast_mix-by-using-simpler-arguments.patch
queue-4.19/revert-random-use-static-branch-for-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.19/random-fix-crash-on-multiple-early-calls-to-add_bootloader_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-blake2s-adjust-include-guard-naming.patch
queue-4.19/random-do-not-allow-user-to-keep-crng-key-around-on-stack.patch
queue-4.19/x86-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-ratelimiting-for-in-kernel-unseeded-randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-unused-irq_flags-argument-from-add_interrupt_randomness.patch
queue-4.19/random-prepend-remaining-pool-constants-with-pool_.patch
queue-4.19/powerpc-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.19/random-remove-unused-output_pool-constants.patch
queue-4.19/mips-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-just-c0-random.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-hash-function-for-crng_slow_load.patch
queue-4.19/random-fix-typo-in-comments.patch
queue-4.19/random-use-proper-return-types-on-get_random_-int-long-_wait.patch
