This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: random-access-input_pool_data-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From foo@baz Fri Jun 17 08:58:56 AM CEST 2022 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Sat, 15 Jan 2022 14:40:04 +0100 Subject: random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> commit 6c0eace6e1499712583b6ee62d95161e8b3449f5 upstream. This gets rid of another abstraction we no longer need. It would be nice if we could instead make pool an array rather than a pointer, but the latent entropy plugin won't be able to do its magic in that case. So instead we put all accesses to the input pool's actual data through the input_pool_data array directly. Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/char/random.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ * * The primary kernel interface is * - * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); + * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); * * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, * and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a @@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ * * For less critical applications, there are the functions: * - * u32 get_random_u32() - * u64 get_random_u64() - * unsigned int get_random_int() - * unsigned long get_random_long() + * u32 get_random_u32() + * u64 get_random_u64() + * unsigned int get_random_int() + * unsigned long get_random_long() * * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes, * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended @@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ * from the devices are: * * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); - * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, + * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); - * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); + * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); @@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created * by using the commands: * - * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 - * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 + * mknod /dev/random c 1 8 + * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9 * * Acknowledgements: * ================= @@ -443,9 +443,9 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list); struct crng_state { - u32 state[16]; - unsigned long init_time; - spinlock_t lock; + u32 state[16]; + unsigned long init_time; + spinlock_t lock; }; static struct crng_state primary_crng = { @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; -#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) +#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); @@ -496,17 +496,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct { - /* read-only data: */ - u32 *pool; - - /* read-write data: */ spinlock_t lock; u16 add_ptr; u16 input_rotate; int entropy_count; } input_pool = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), - .pool = input_pool_data }; static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min); @@ -514,7 +509,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *bu static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool); -static u32 const twist_table[8] = { +static const u32 twist_table[8] = { 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; @@ -544,15 +539,15 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void * i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK; /* XOR in the various taps */ - w ^= input_pool.pool[i]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; - w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[i]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK]; + w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK]; /* Mix the result back in with a twist */ - input_pool.pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; + input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7]; /* * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool. @@ -584,10 +579,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i } struct fast_pool { - u32 pool[4]; - unsigned long last; - u16 reg_idx; - u8 count; + u32 pool[4]; + unsigned long last; + u16 reg_idx; + u8 count; }; /* @@ -715,7 +710,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int return -EINVAL; /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ - nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); + nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS); credit_entropy_bits(nbits); return 0; @@ -727,7 +722,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int * *********************************************************************/ -#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ) +#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ) static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); @@ -751,9 +746,9 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_tr static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng) { - int i; - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; + int i; + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && @@ -769,9 +764,9 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct cr static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng) { - int i; - bool arch_init = true; - unsigned long rv; + int i; + bool arch_init = true; + unsigned long rv; for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && @@ -841,7 +836,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct wor struct crng_state *crng; struct crng_state **pool; - pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL); + pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); for_each_online_node(i) { crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); @@ -897,7 +892,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); return 0; } - p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; @@ -927,12 +922,12 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c */ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len) { - unsigned long flags; - static u8 lfsr = 1; - u8 tmp; - unsigned int i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE; - const u8 * src_buf = cp; - u8 * dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4]; + unsigned long flags; + static u8 lfsr = 1; + u8 tmp; + unsigned int i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE; + const u8 *src_buf = cp; + u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4]; if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags)) return 0; @@ -943,7 +938,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, if (len > max) max = len; - for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < max; i++) { tmp = lfsr; lfsr >>= 1; if (tmp & 1) @@ -958,11 +953,11 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool) { - unsigned long flags; - int i, num; + unsigned long flags; + int i, num; union { - u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; - u32 key[8]; + u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u32 key[8]; } buf; if (use_input_pool) { @@ -976,11 +971,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - unsigned long rv; + unsigned long rv; if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) rv = random_get_entropy(); - crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; + crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; } memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); @@ -988,8 +983,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat crng_finalize_init(crng); } -static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) +static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long flags, init_time; @@ -1018,9 +1012,9 @@ static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA20 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { - unsigned long flags; - u32 *s, *d; - int i; + unsigned long flags; + u32 *s, *d; + int i; used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32)); if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { @@ -1028,9 +1022,9 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru used = 0; } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - s = (u32 *) &tmp[used]; + s = (u32 *)&tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4]; - for (i=0; i < 8; i++) + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } @@ -1075,7 +1069,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __ return ret; } - /********************************************************************* * * Entropy input management @@ -1170,11 +1163,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ - credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11)); + credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, - unsigned int value) + unsigned int value) { static unsigned char last_value; @@ -1194,19 +1187,19 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; -#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ -#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1)) +#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ +#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1)) static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) { - long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; + long delta = random_get_entropy() - start; - /* Use a weighted moving average */ - delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); - avg_cycles += delta; - /* And average deviation */ - delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); - avg_deviation += delta; + /* Use a weighted moving average */ + delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); + avg_cycles += delta; + /* And average deviation */ + delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT); + avg_deviation += delta; } #else #define add_interrupt_bench(x) @@ -1214,7 +1207,7 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { - u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs; + u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs; unsigned int idx; if (regs == NULL) @@ -1229,12 +1222,12 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { - struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); - struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); - unsigned long now = jiffies; - cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); - u32 c_high, j_high; - u64 ip; + struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness); + struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs(); + unsigned long now = jiffies; + cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); + u32 c_high, j_high; + u64 ip; if (cycles == 0) cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); @@ -1244,8 +1237,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high; ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_; fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip; - fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : - get_reg(fast_pool, regs); + fast_pool->pool[3] ^= + (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs); fast_mix(fast_pool); add_interrupt_bench(cycles); @@ -1259,8 +1252,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) return; } - if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && - !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) + if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ)) return; if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock)) @@ -1324,7 +1316,7 @@ retry: entropy_count = 0; } nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); - if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac) + if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac; else entropy_count = 0; @@ -1369,7 +1361,7 @@ static void extract_buf(u8 *out) /* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags); - blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool.pool, POOL_BYTES); + blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES); blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */ /* @@ -1427,10 +1419,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf } #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \ - _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous)) + _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous)) -static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, - void **previous) +static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous) { #ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM const bool print_once = false; @@ -1438,8 +1429,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co static bool print_once __read_mostly; #endif - if (print_once || - crng_ready() || + if (print_once || crng_ready() || (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous)))) return; WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller); @@ -1447,9 +1437,8 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co print_once = true; #endif if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning)) - printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS " - "with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller, - crng_init); + printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", + func_name, caller, crng_init); } /* @@ -1492,7 +1481,6 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); - /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another @@ -1531,7 +1519,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0); while (!crng_ready()) { if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer)) - mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1); + mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1); mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now)); schedule(); stack.now = random_get_entropy(); @@ -1741,9 +1729,8 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk } #endif -static ssize_t -urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, - loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) { int ret; @@ -1753,8 +1740,8 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, c return ret; } -static ssize_t -urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) { static int maxwarn = 10; @@ -1768,8 +1755,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __u return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); } -static ssize_t -random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, + loff_t *ppos) { int ret; @@ -1779,8 +1766,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __us return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos); } -static __poll_t -random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait) +static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { __poll_t mask; @@ -1794,8 +1780,7 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl return mask; } -static int -write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) +static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; u32 t, buf[16]; @@ -1897,35 +1882,35 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct } const struct file_operations random_fops = { - .read = random_read, + .read = random_read, .write = random_write, - .poll = random_poll, + .poll = random_poll, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { - .read = urandom_read, + .read = urandom_read, .write = random_write, .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl, .fasync = random_fasync, .llseek = noop_llseek, }; -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, - unsigned int, flags) +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, + flags) { int ret; - if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE)) + if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)) return -EINVAL; /* * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes * no sense. */ - if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) + if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; if (count > INT_MAX) @@ -2073,7 +2058,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { #endif { } }; -#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ struct batched_entropy { union { @@ -2093,7 +2078,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { * point prior. */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { - .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock), + .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock), }; u64 get_random_u64(void) @@ -2118,7 +2103,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { - .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock), + .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock), }; u32 get_random_u32(void) { @@ -2150,7 +2135,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v int cpu; unsigned long flags; - for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy; batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu); @@ -2179,8 +2164,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error, * @start is returned. */ -unsigned long -randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) +unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range) { if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) { range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from Jason@xxxxxxxxx are queue-4.19/random-do-not-take-pool-spinlock-at-boot.patch queue-4.19/random-remove-kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold.patch queue-4.19/random-simplify-arithmetic-function-flow-in-account.patch queue-4.19/random-order-timer-entropy-functions-below-interrupt-functions.patch queue-4.19/random-introduce-drain_entropy-helper-to-declutter-crng_reseed.patch queue-4.19/random-fix-locking-in-crng_fast_load.patch queue-4.19/random-cleanup-uuid-handling.patch queue-4.19/random-group-userspace-read-write-functions.patch queue-4.19/random-make-credit_entropy_bits-always-safe.patch queue-4.19/latent_entropy-avoid-build-error-when-plugin-cflags-are-not-set.patch queue-4.19/revert-hwrng-core-freeze-khwrng-thread-during-suspend.patch queue-4.19/drivers-char-random.c-make-primary_crng-static.patch queue-4.19/random-do-not-re-init-if-crng_reseed-completes-before-primary-init.patch queue-4.19/random-use-proper-jiffies-comparison-macro.patch queue-4.19/init-call-time_init-before-rand_initialize.patch queue-4.19/random-split-primary-secondary-crng-init-paths.patch queue-4.19/random-pull-add_hwgenerator_randomness-declaration-into-random.h.patch queue-4.19/random-unify-early-init-crng-load-accounting.patch queue-4.19/drivers-char-random.c-remove-unused-stuct-poolinfo-poolbits.patch queue-4.19/random-use-blake2s-instead-of-sha1-in-extraction.patch queue-4.19/random-convert-to-using-fops-write_iter.patch queue-4.19/random-initialize-chacha20-constants-with-correct-endianness.patch queue-4.19/random-remove-incomplete-last_data-logic.patch queue-4.19/random-group-entropy-extraction-functions.patch queue-4.19/random-add-proper-spdx-header.patch queue-4.19/linux-random.h-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch queue-4.19/random-rewrite-header-introductory-comment.patch queue-4.19/random-make-dev-random-be-almost-like-dev-urandom.patch queue-4.19/random-remove-ifdef-d-out-interrupt-bench.patch queue-4.19/um-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch queue-4.19/lib-crypto-sha1-re-roll-loops-to-reduce-code-size.patch queue-4.19/random-tie-batched-entropy-generation-to-base_crng-generation.patch queue-4.19/sparc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch queue-4.19/random-use-linear-min-entropy-accumulation-crediting.patch queue-4.19/random-remove-batched-entropy-locking.patch queue-4.19/xtensa-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch queue-4.19/powerpc-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch queue-4.19/fdt-add-support-for-rng-seed.patch queue-4.19/random-continually-use-hwgenerator-randomness.patch queue-4.19/random-access-input_pool_data-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch queue-4.19/random-add-arch_get_random_-long_early.patch queue-4.19/random-inline-leaves-of-rand_initialize.patch queue-4.19/random-cleanup-poolinfo-abstraction.patch queue-4.19/random-wire-up-fops-splice_-read-write-_iter.patch queue-4.19/random-handle-latent-entropy-and-command-line-from-random_init.patch queue-4.19/random-remove-use_input_pool-parameter-from-crng_reseed.patch queue-4.19/random-credit-architectural-init-the-exact-amount.patch queue-4.19/ia64-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch queue-4.19/random-replace-custom-notifier-chain-with-standard-one.patch queue-4.19/random-support-freezable-kthreads-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch queue-4.19/random-document-get_random_int-family.patch queue-4.19/random-remove-the-blocking-pool.patch queue-4.19/random-avoid-initializing-twice-in-credit-race.patch queue-4.19/random-avoid-warnings-for-config_numa-builds.patch 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