This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
random-use-rdseed-instead-of-rdrand-in-entropy-extraction.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From foo@baz Thu Jun 16 07:08:33 PM CEST 2022
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 12:18:33 +0100
Subject: random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
commit 28f425e573e906a4c15f8392cc2b1561ef448595 upstream.
When /dev/random was directly connected with entropy extraction, without
any expansion stage, extract_buf() was called for every 10 bytes of data
read from /dev/random. For that reason, RDRAND was used rather than
RDSEED. At the same time, crng_reseed() was still only called every 5
minutes, so there RDSEED made sense.
Those olden days were also a time when the entropy collector did not use
a cryptographic hash function, which meant most bets were off in terms
of real preimage resistance. For that reason too it didn't matter
_that_ much whether RDSEED was mixed in before or after entropy
extraction; both choices were sort of bad.
But now we have a cryptographic hash function at work, and with that we
get real preimage resistance. We also now only call extract_entropy()
every 5 minutes, rather than every 10 bytes. This allows us to do two
important things.
First, we can switch to using RDSEED in extract_entropy(), as Dominik
suggested. Second, we can ensure that RDSEED input always goes into the
cryptographic hash function with other things before being used
directly. This eliminates a category of attacks in which the CPU knows
the current state of the crng and knows that we're going to xor RDSEED
into it, and so it computes a malicious RDSEED. By going through our
hash function, it would require the CPU to compute a preimage on the
fly, which isn't going to happen.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 246 ++++++++++++--------------------------------------
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 184 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -323,14 +323,11 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
* its value (from 0->1->2).
*/
static int crng_init = 0;
-static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
static void process_random_ready_list(void);
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
@@ -365,7 +362,7 @@ static struct {
static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng);
+static void crng_reseed(void);
/*
* This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
@@ -464,7 +461,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
trace_credit_entropy_bits(nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
+ crng_reseed();
}
/*********************************************************************
@@ -477,14 +474,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
-/*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
- */
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-
static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
@@ -494,24 +483,6 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *
}
early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
-static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- int i;
- bool arch_init = true;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- arch_init = false;
- }
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
- }
-
- return arch_init;
-}
-
static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void)
{
int i;
@@ -530,100 +501,17 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea
return arch_init;
}
-static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
- _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
- crng_init_try_arch(crng);
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
-}
-
-static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void)
+static void __init crng_initialize(void)
{
extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
crng_init = 2;
pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
}
primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
}
-static void crng_finalize_init(void)
-{
- if (!system_wq) {
- /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues,
- * so mark this for processing later. */
- crng_need_final_init = true;
- return;
- }
-
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- crng_need_final_init = false;
- process_random_ready_list();
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
- pr_notice("crng init done\n");
- if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- unseeded_warning.missed);
- unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
- }
- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- urandom_warning.missed);
- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
- }
-}
-
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize_secondary(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
- for_each_node(i)
- kfree(pool[i]);
- kfree(pool);
- }
-}
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
-
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA))
- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) {
- struct crng_state **pool;
- int nid = numa_node_id();
-
- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
- if (pool && pool[nid])
- return pool[nid];
- }
-
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-
/*
* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
@@ -701,73 +589,71 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
return 1;
}
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng)
+static void crng_reseed(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
- int i;
+ int i, entropy_count;
union {
u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
u32 key[8];
} buf;
- if (crng == &primary_crng) {
- int entropy_count;
- do {
- entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
- if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
- return;
- } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
- extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
- } else {
- _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
- _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
- CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- unsigned long rv;
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
- }
+ do {
+ entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+ if (entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
+ return;
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
+ extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
+ wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ primary_crng.state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i];
memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
- WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2)
- crng_finalize_init();
+ WRITE_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time, jiffies);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (crng_init < 2) {
+ invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ crng_init = 2;
+ process_random_ready_list();
+ wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+ if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
+ pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ unseeded_warning.missed);
+ unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
+ }
+ if (urandom_warning.missed) {
+ pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ urandom_warning.missed);
+ urandom_warning.missed = 0;
+ }
+ }
}
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
{
unsigned long flags, init_time;
if (crng_ready()) {
- init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
- if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
- time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(crng);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
- if (crng->state[12] == 0)
- crng->state[13]++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- _extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
+ init_time = READ_ONCE(primary_crng.init_time);
+ if (time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+ crng_reseed();
+ }
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ chacha20_block(&primary_crng.state[0], out);
+ if (primary_crng.state[12] == 0)
+ primary_crng.state[13]++;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
}
/*
* Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
* enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
*/
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
{
unsigned long flags;
u32 *s, *d;
@@ -778,17 +664,12 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru
extract_crng(tmp);
used = 0;
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
- d = &crng->state[4];
+ d = &primary_crng.state[4];
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
*d++ ^= *s++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
- _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
}
static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
@@ -1053,16 +934,17 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
unsigned long flags;
u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
struct {
- unsigned long rdrand[32 / sizeof(long)];
+ unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
size_t counter;
} block;
size_t i;
trace_extract_entropy(nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdrand); ++i) {
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&block.rdrand[i]))
- block.rdrand[i] = random_get_entropy();
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
+ block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
@@ -1070,7 +952,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
- /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || 0) */
+ /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
block.counter = 0;
blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
@@ -1080,7 +962,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
while (nbytes) {
i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
- /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || ++counter) */
+ /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
++block.counter;
blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
nbytes -= i;
@@ -1374,10 +1256,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void)
int __init rand_initialize(void)
{
init_std_data();
- if (crng_need_final_init)
- crng_finalize_init();
- crng_initialize_primary();
- crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
+ crng_initialize();
if (ratelimit_disable) {
urandom_warning.interval = 0;
unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
@@ -1547,8 +1426,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
return -EPERM;
if (crng_init < 2)
return -ENODATA;
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng);
- WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+ crng_reseed();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from Jason@xxxxxxxxx are
queue-4.14/random-do-not-take-pool-spinlock-at-boot.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold.patch
queue-4.14/random-simplify-arithmetic-function-flow-in-account.patch
queue-4.14/random-order-timer-entropy-functions-below-interrupt-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-introduce-drain_entropy-helper-to-declutter-crng_reseed.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-locking-in-crng_fast_load.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-uuid-handling.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-userspace-read-write-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-credit_entropy_bits-always-safe.patch
queue-4.14/latent_entropy-avoid-build-error-when-plugin-cflags-are-not-set.patch
queue-4.14/revert-hwrng-core-freeze-khwrng-thread-during-suspend.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-make-primary_crng-static.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-re-init-if-crng_reseed-completes-before-primary-init.patch
queue-4.14/random-always-fill-buffer-in-get_random_bytes_wait.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-proper-jiffies-comparison-macro.patch
queue-4.14/init-call-time_init-before-rand_initialize.patch
queue-4.14/random-split-primary-secondary-crng-init-paths.patch
queue-4.14/random-pull-add_hwgenerator_randomness-declaration-into-random.h.patch
queue-4.14/random-unify-early-init-crng-load-accounting.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-remove-unused-stuct-poolinfo-poolbits.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-blake2s-instead-of-sha1-in-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-cpu-trust-a-boot-parameter.patch
queue-4.14/random-convert-to-using-fops-write_iter.patch
queue-4.14/random-initialize-chacha20-constants-with-correct-endianness.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-incomplete-last_data-logic.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-entropy-extraction-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-optimize-add_interrupt_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-proper-spdx-header.patch
queue-4.14/linux-random.h-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-rewrite-header-introductory-comment.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-dev-random-be-almost-like-dev-urandom.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-ifdef-d-out-interrupt-bench.patch
queue-4.14/um-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/lib-crypto-sha1-re-roll-loops-to-reduce-code-size.patch
queue-4.14/random-tie-batched-entropy-generation-to-base_crng-generation.patch
queue-4.14/sparc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-linear-min-entropy-accumulation-crediting.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-batched-entropy-locking.patch
queue-4.14/xtensa-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/powerpc-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/fdt-add-support-for-rng-seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-continually-use-hwgenerator-randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-access-input_pool_data-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-arch_get_random_-long_early.patch
queue-4.14/random-inline-leaves-of-rand_initialize.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-poolinfo-abstraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-wire-up-fops-splice_-read-write-_iter.patch
queue-4.14/random-handle-latent-entropy-and-command-line-from-random_init.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-use_input_pool-parameter-from-crng_reseed.patch
queue-4.14/random-credit-architectural-init-the-exact-amount.patch
queue-4.14/ia64-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-replace-custom-notifier-chain-with-standard-one.patch
queue-4.14/random-support-freezable-kthreads-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-document-get_random_int-family.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-the-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-initializing-twice-in-credit-race.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-warnings-for-config_numa-builds.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-add-fips-140-2-ctrng-for-noise-source.patch
queue-4.14/random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch
queue-4.14/random-zero-buffer-after-reading-entropy-from-userspace.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-whitespace-and-reorder-includes.patch
queue-4.14/random-ignore-grnd_random-in-getentropy-2.patch
queue-4.14/random-clear-fast-pool-crng-and-batches-in-cpuhp-bring-up.patch
queue-4.14/random-document-add_hwgenerator_randomness-with-other-input-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-typo-in-add_timer_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-crng-pre-init-loading-in-worker-rather-than-irq.patch
queue-4.14/powerpc-use-bool-in-archrandom.h.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-split-fast-init-input-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/timekeeping-add-raw-clock-fallback-for-random_get_entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-early-initialization-of-chacha-constants.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-prepare-for-more-fine-grained-tracking-of-seeding-state.patch
queue-4.14/random-delete-code-to-pull-data-into-pools.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-always-try-to-free-jitter-rng-instance.patch
queue-4.14/random-simplify-entropy-debiting.patch
queue-4.14/random-don-t-reset-crng_init_cnt-on-urandom_read.patch
queue-4.14/random-skip-fast_init-if-hwrng-provides-large-chunk-of-entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-siphash-as-interrupt-entropy-accumulator.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-soft-lockup-when-trying-to-read-from-an-uninitialized-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-sysctl-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-don-t-let-644-read-only-sysctls-be-written-to.patch
queue-4.14/random-document-crng_fast_key_erasure-destination-possibility.patch
queue-4.14/random-only-wake-up-writers-after-zap-if-threshold-was-passed.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-wait_event_freezable-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signal-and-try-earlier-when-generating-entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signals-every-page_size-chunk-of-dev-random.patch
queue-4.14/arm-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/random-absorb-fast-pool-into-input-pool-after-fast-load.patch
queue-4.14/random-give-sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed-a-more-sensible-value.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-blake2s-generic-c-library-implementation-and-selftest.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-fractional-entropy-shift-constants.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-rdseed-instead-of-rdrand-in-entropy-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-move-rand_initialize-earlier.patch
queue-4.14/random-don-t-wake-crng_init_wait-when-crng_init-1.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-a-urandom_read_nowait-for-random-apis-that-don-t-warn.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-sign-extend-bytes-for-rotation-when-mixing.patch
queue-4.14/random-move-initialization-functions-out-of-hot-pages.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-dead-code-left-over-from-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-constify-poolinfo_table.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-track-whether-drbg-was-seeded-with-rng_is_initialized.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-computational-hash-for-entropy-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-and-use-pr_fmt.patch
queue-4.14/random-round-robin-registers-as-ulong-not-u32.patch
queue-4.14/random-always-wake-up-entropy-writers-after-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/s390-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-xor-rdrand-when-writing-into-dev-random.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-make-reseeding-from-get_random_bytes-synchronous.patch
queue-4.14/random-convert-to-entropy_bits-for-better-code-readability.patch
queue-4.14/char-random-add-a-newline-at-the-end-of-the-file.patch
queue-4.14/random-move-randomize_page-into-mm-where-it-belongs.patch
queue-4.14/random-only-call-crng_finalize_init-for-primary_crng.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-integer-types.patch
queue-4.14/random-re-add-removed-comment-about-get_random_-u32-u64-reseeding.patch
queue-4.14/random-unify-cycles_t-and-jiffies-usage-and-types.patch
queue-4.14/random-insist-on-random_get_entropy-existing-in-order-to-simplify.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-initialization-wait-functions.patch
queue-4.14/linux-random.h-mark-config_arch_random-functions-__must_check.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-extract_entropy-reserved-argument.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signal_pending-outside-of-need_resched-check.patch
queue-4.14/random-access-primary_pool-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-sysctl-documentation-nits.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-tracepoints.patch
queue-4.14/random-only-read-from-dev-random-after-its-pool-has-received-128-bits.patch
queue-4.14/nios2-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/random-treat-bootloader-trust-toggle-the-same-way-as-cpu-trust-toggle.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-consistent-usage-of-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/lib-crypto-blake2s-move-hmac-construction-into-wireguard.patch
queue-4.14/parisc-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/x86-tsc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-chacha20-fix-keystream-alignment-for-chacha20_block.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-grnd_insecure-to-return-best-effort-non-cryptographic-bytes.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-whitespace-pre-random-bytes-work.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-move-dynamic-reseed_threshold-adjustments-to-__drbg_seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signals-after-page-of-pool-writes.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-random_get_entropy-return-an-unsigned-long.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-crng_init-0-in-add_device_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-cpu-s-hwrng.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unnecessary-unlikely.patch
queue-4.14/random-defer-fast-pool-mixing-to-worker.patch
queue-4.14/random-harmonize-crng-init-done-messages.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-blake2s-include-linux-bug.h-instead-of-asm-bug.h.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-static-branch-for-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/random-rather-than-entropy_store-abstraction-use-global.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-remove-unused-dont_count_entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-extern-from-functions-in-header.patch
queue-4.14/siphash-use-one-source-of-truth-for-siphash-permutations.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-entropy-collection-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-de-duplicate-input_pool-constants.patch
queue-4.14/random-mix-build-time-latent-entropy-into-pool-at-init.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-useless-header-comment.patch
queue-4.14/linux-random.h-use-false-with-bool.patch
queue-4.14/maintainers-co-maintain-random.c.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-outdated-int_max-6-check-in-urandom_read.patch
queue-4.14/m68k-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/alpha-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-mix-bootloader-randomness-into-pool.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-some-dead-code-of-poolinfo.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-use-batches-when-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-always-seeded-with-sp800-90b-compliant-noise-source.patch
queue-4.14/s390-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-pretend-to-handle-premature-next-security-model.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-arch_get_random_seed_long-when-collecting-irq-randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-is_enabled-config_numa-instead-of-ifdefs.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-crng-state-queryable.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-superfluous-call-to-rdrand-in-crng-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-symbolic-constants-for-crng_init-states.patch
queue-4.14/random-reseed-more-often-immediately-after-booting.patch
queue-4.14/random-ensure-early-rdseed-goes-through-mixer-on-init.patch
queue-4.14/random-deobfuscate-irq-u32-u64-contributions.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-use-input-pool-from-hard-irqs.patch
queue-4.14/random-help-compiler-out-with-fast_mix-by-using-simpler-arguments.patch
queue-4.14/revert-random-use-static-branch-for-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-crash-on-multiple-early-calls-to-add_bootloader_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-return-nbytes-filled-from-hw-rng.patch
queue-4.14/random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-blake2s-adjust-include-guard-naming.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-allow-user-to-keep-crng-key-around-on-stack.patch
queue-4.14/x86-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-deduplicate-le32_to_cpu_array-and-cpu_to_le32_array.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-ratelimiting-for-in-kernel-unseeded-randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-irq_flags-argument-from-add_interrupt_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-prepend-remaining-pool-constants-with-pool_.patch
queue-4.14/powerpc-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-output_pool-constants.patch
queue-4.14/mips-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-just-c0-random.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-hash-function-for-crng_slow_load.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-typo-in-comments.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-preempt-disabled-region.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-proper-return-types-on-get_random_-int-long-_wait.patch
