Patch "random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     random-order-timer-entropy-functions-below-interrupt-functions.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.


>From foo@baz Thu Jun 16 07:08:33 PM CEST 2022
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 18:27:38 +0200
Subject: random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>

commit a4b5c26b79ffdfcfb816c198f2fc2b1e7b5b580f upstream.

There are no code changes here; this is just a reordering of functions,
so that in subsequent commits, the timer entropy functions can call into
the interrupt ones.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  238 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -851,13 +851,13 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * the above entropy accumulation routines:
  *
  *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
- *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- *	                          unsigned int value);
- *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
  *					size_t entropy);
  *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ *	                          unsigned int value);
+ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
  * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@@ -867,19 +867,6 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
  * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
  *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
- * as the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
- * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
- * order deltas of the event timings.
- *
  * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
  * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
  * block until more entropy is needed.
@@ -893,6 +880,19 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
  * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
  *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
  **********************************************************************/
 
 static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
@@ -970,109 +970,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
 
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
-	unsigned long last_time;
-	long last_delta, last_delta2;
-};
-
-/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- */
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
-{
-	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
-	long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-
-	if (crng_ready())
-		return;
-
-	/*
-	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
-	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
-	 * in order to make our estimate.
-	 */
-	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
-	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
-
-	delta2 = delta - state->last_delta;
-	state->last_delta = delta;
-
-	delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2;
-	state->last_delta2 = delta2;
-
-	if (delta < 0)
-		delta = -delta;
-	if (delta2 < 0)
-		delta2 = -delta2;
-	if (delta3 < 0)
-		delta3 = -delta3;
-	if (delta > delta2)
-		delta = delta2;
-	if (delta > delta3)
-		delta = delta3;
-
-	/*
-	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
-	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
-	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
-	 */
-	credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
-}
-
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-			  unsigned int value)
-{
-	static unsigned char last_value;
-	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
-
-	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
-	if (value == last_value)
-		return;
-
-	last_value = value;
-	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
-			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	if (!disk || !disk->random)
-		return;
-	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
-	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
-	struct timer_rand_state *state;
-
-	/*
-	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
-	 * source.
-	 */
-	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (state) {
-		state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
-		disk->random = state;
-	}
-}
-#endif
-
 /*
  * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
  * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
@@ -1234,6 +1131,109 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
 
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+	unsigned long last_time;
+	long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
+ *
+ * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
+ * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
+ */
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
+{
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+	long delta, delta2, delta3;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+	_mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+
+	if (crng_ready())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+	 * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+	 * in order to make our estimate.
+	 */
+	delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
+
+	delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
+
+	delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+	WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
+
+	if (delta < 0)
+		delta = -delta;
+	if (delta2 < 0)
+		delta2 = -delta2;
+	if (delta3 < 0)
+		delta3 = -delta3;
+	if (delta > delta2)
+		delta = delta2;
+	if (delta > delta3)
+		delta = delta3;
+
+	/*
+	 * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
+	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
+	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
+	 */
+	credit_init_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
+}
+
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+			  unsigned int value)
+{
+	static unsigned char last_value;
+	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+	/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+	if (value == last_value)
+		return;
+
+	last_value = value;
+	add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+			     (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	if (!disk || !disk->random)
+		return;
+	/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+	add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
+
+void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	struct timer_rand_state *state;
+
+	/*
+	 * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
+	 * source.
+	 */
+	state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (state) {
+		state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
+		disk->random = state;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from Jason@xxxxxxxxx are

queue-4.14/random-do-not-take-pool-spinlock-at-boot.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold.patch
queue-4.14/random-simplify-arithmetic-function-flow-in-account.patch
queue-4.14/random-order-timer-entropy-functions-below-interrupt-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-introduce-drain_entropy-helper-to-declutter-crng_reseed.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-locking-in-crng_fast_load.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-uuid-handling.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-userspace-read-write-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-credit_entropy_bits-always-safe.patch
queue-4.14/latent_entropy-avoid-build-error-when-plugin-cflags-are-not-set.patch
queue-4.14/revert-hwrng-core-freeze-khwrng-thread-during-suspend.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-make-primary_crng-static.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-re-init-if-crng_reseed-completes-before-primary-init.patch
queue-4.14/random-always-fill-buffer-in-get_random_bytes_wait.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-proper-jiffies-comparison-macro.patch
queue-4.14/init-call-time_init-before-rand_initialize.patch
queue-4.14/random-split-primary-secondary-crng-init-paths.patch
queue-4.14/random-pull-add_hwgenerator_randomness-declaration-into-random.h.patch
queue-4.14/random-unify-early-init-crng-load-accounting.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-remove-unused-stuct-poolinfo-poolbits.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-blake2s-instead-of-sha1-in-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-cpu-trust-a-boot-parameter.patch
queue-4.14/random-convert-to-using-fops-write_iter.patch
queue-4.14/random-initialize-chacha20-constants-with-correct-endianness.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-incomplete-last_data-logic.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-entropy-extraction-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-optimize-add_interrupt_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-proper-spdx-header.patch
queue-4.14/linux-random.h-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-rewrite-header-introductory-comment.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-dev-random-be-almost-like-dev-urandom.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-ifdef-d-out-interrupt-bench.patch
queue-4.14/um-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/lib-crypto-sha1-re-roll-loops-to-reduce-code-size.patch
queue-4.14/random-tie-batched-entropy-generation-to-base_crng-generation.patch
queue-4.14/sparc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-linear-min-entropy-accumulation-crediting.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-batched-entropy-locking.patch
queue-4.14/xtensa-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/powerpc-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/fdt-add-support-for-rng-seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-continually-use-hwgenerator-randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-access-input_pool_data-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-arch_get_random_-long_early.patch
queue-4.14/random-inline-leaves-of-rand_initialize.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-poolinfo-abstraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-wire-up-fops-splice_-read-write-_iter.patch
queue-4.14/random-handle-latent-entropy-and-command-line-from-random_init.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-use_input_pool-parameter-from-crng_reseed.patch
queue-4.14/random-credit-architectural-init-the-exact-amount.patch
queue-4.14/ia64-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-replace-custom-notifier-chain-with-standard-one.patch
queue-4.14/random-support-freezable-kthreads-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-document-get_random_int-family.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-the-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-initializing-twice-in-credit-race.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-warnings-for-config_numa-builds.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-add-fips-140-2-ctrng-for-noise-source.patch
queue-4.14/random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch
queue-4.14/random-zero-buffer-after-reading-entropy-from-userspace.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-whitespace-and-reorder-includes.patch
queue-4.14/random-ignore-grnd_random-in-getentropy-2.patch
queue-4.14/random-clear-fast-pool-crng-and-batches-in-cpuhp-bring-up.patch
queue-4.14/random-document-add_hwgenerator_randomness-with-other-input-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-typo-in-add_timer_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-crng-pre-init-loading-in-worker-rather-than-irq.patch
queue-4.14/powerpc-use-bool-in-archrandom.h.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-split-fast-init-input-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/timekeeping-add-raw-clock-fallback-for-random_get_entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-early-initialization-of-chacha-constants.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-prepare-for-more-fine-grained-tracking-of-seeding-state.patch
queue-4.14/random-delete-code-to-pull-data-into-pools.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-always-try-to-free-jitter-rng-instance.patch
queue-4.14/random-simplify-entropy-debiting.patch
queue-4.14/random-don-t-reset-crng_init_cnt-on-urandom_read.patch
queue-4.14/random-skip-fast_init-if-hwrng-provides-large-chunk-of-entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-siphash-as-interrupt-entropy-accumulator.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-soft-lockup-when-trying-to-read-from-an-uninitialized-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-sysctl-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-don-t-let-644-read-only-sysctls-be-written-to.patch
queue-4.14/random-document-crng_fast_key_erasure-destination-possibility.patch
queue-4.14/random-only-wake-up-writers-after-zap-if-threshold-was-passed.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-wait_event_freezable-in-add_hwgenerator_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signal-and-try-earlier-when-generating-entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signals-every-page_size-chunk-of-dev-random.patch
queue-4.14/arm-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/random-absorb-fast-pool-into-input-pool-after-fast-load.patch
queue-4.14/random-give-sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed-a-more-sensible-value.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-blake2s-generic-c-library-implementation-and-selftest.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-fractional-entropy-shift-constants.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-rdseed-instead-of-rdrand-in-entropy-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-move-rand_initialize-earlier.patch
queue-4.14/random-don-t-wake-crng_init_wait-when-crng_init-1.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-a-urandom_read_nowait-for-random-apis-that-don-t-warn.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-sign-extend-bytes-for-rotation-when-mixing.patch
queue-4.14/random-move-initialization-functions-out-of-hot-pages.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-dead-code-left-over-from-blocking-pool.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-constify-poolinfo_table.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-track-whether-drbg-was-seeded-with-rng_is_initialized.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-computational-hash-for-entropy-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-and-use-pr_fmt.patch
queue-4.14/random-round-robin-registers-as-ulong-not-u32.patch
queue-4.14/random-always-wake-up-entropy-writers-after-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/s390-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-xor-rdrand-when-writing-into-dev-random.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-make-reseeding-from-get_random_bytes-synchronous.patch
queue-4.14/random-convert-to-entropy_bits-for-better-code-readability.patch
queue-4.14/char-random-add-a-newline-at-the-end-of-the-file.patch
queue-4.14/random-move-randomize_page-into-mm-where-it-belongs.patch
queue-4.14/random-only-call-crng_finalize_init-for-primary_crng.patch
queue-4.14/random-cleanup-integer-types.patch
queue-4.14/random-re-add-removed-comment-about-get_random_-u32-u64-reseeding.patch
queue-4.14/random-unify-cycles_t-and-jiffies-usage-and-types.patch
queue-4.14/random-insist-on-random_get_entropy-existing-in-order-to-simplify.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-initialization-wait-functions.patch
queue-4.14/linux-random.h-mark-config_arch_random-functions-__must_check.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-extract_entropy-reserved-argument.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signal_pending-outside-of-need_resched-check.patch
queue-4.14/random-access-primary_pool-directly-rather-than-through-pointer.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-sysctl-documentation-nits.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-tracepoints.patch
queue-4.14/random-only-read-from-dev-random-after-its-pool-has-received-128-bits.patch
queue-4.14/nios2-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/random-treat-bootloader-trust-toggle-the-same-way-as-cpu-trust-toggle.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-consistent-usage-of-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/lib-crypto-blake2s-move-hmac-construction-into-wireguard.patch
queue-4.14/parisc-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/x86-tsc-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-chacha20-fix-keystream-alignment-for-chacha20_block.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-grnd_insecure-to-return-best-effort-non-cryptographic-bytes.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-whitespace-pre-random-bytes-work.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-move-dynamic-reseed_threshold-adjustments-to-__drbg_seed.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-signals-after-page-of-pool-writes.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-random_get_entropy-return-an-unsigned-long.patch
queue-4.14/random-check-for-crng_init-0-in-add_device_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-cpu-s-hwrng.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unnecessary-unlikely.patch
queue-4.14/random-defer-fast-pool-mixing-to-worker.patch
queue-4.14/random-harmonize-crng-init-done-messages.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-blake2s-include-linux-bug.h-instead-of-asm-bug.h.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-static-branch-for-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/random-rather-than-entropy_store-abstraction-use-global.patch
queue-4.14/drivers-char-random.c-remove-unused-dont_count_entropy.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-extern-from-functions-in-header.patch
queue-4.14/siphash-use-one-source-of-truth-for-siphash-permutations.patch
queue-4.14/random-group-entropy-collection-functions.patch
queue-4.14/random-de-duplicate-input_pool-constants.patch
queue-4.14/random-mix-build-time-latent-entropy-into-pool-at-init.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-useless-header-comment.patch
queue-4.14/linux-random.h-use-false-with-bool.patch
queue-4.14/maintainers-co-maintain-random.c.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-outdated-int_max-6-check-in-urandom_read.patch
queue-4.14/m68k-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-zero.patch
queue-4.14/alpha-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-mix-bootloader-randomness-into-pool.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-some-dead-code-of-poolinfo.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-use-batches-when-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-drbg-always-seeded-with-sp800-90b-compliant-noise-source.patch
queue-4.14/s390-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-pretend-to-handle-premature-next-security-model.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-arch_get_random_seed_long-when-collecting-irq-randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-is_enabled-config_numa-instead-of-ifdefs.patch
queue-4.14/random-make-crng-state-queryable.patch
queue-4.14/random-avoid-superfluous-call-to-rdrand-in-crng-extraction.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-symbolic-constants-for-crng_init-states.patch
queue-4.14/random-reseed-more-often-immediately-after-booting.patch
queue-4.14/random-ensure-early-rdseed-goes-through-mixer-on-init.patch
queue-4.14/random-deobfuscate-irq-u32-u64-contributions.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-use-input-pool-from-hard-irqs.patch
queue-4.14/random-help-compiler-out-with-fast_mix-by-using-simpler-arguments.patch
queue-4.14/revert-random-use-static-branch-for-crng_ready.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-crash-on-multiple-early-calls-to-add_bootloader_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-return-nbytes-filled-from-hw-rng.patch
queue-4.14/random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-blake2s-adjust-include-guard-naming.patch
queue-4.14/random-do-not-allow-user-to-keep-crng-key-around-on-stack.patch
queue-4.14/x86-remove-arch_has_random-arch_has_random_seed.patch
queue-4.14/crypto-deduplicate-le32_to_cpu_array-and-cpu_to_le32_array.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-ratelimiting-for-in-kernel-unseeded-randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-irq_flags-argument-from-add_interrupt_randomness.patch
queue-4.14/random-prepend-remaining-pool-constants-with-pool_.patch
queue-4.14/powerpc-define-get_cycles-macro-for-arch-override.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-unused-output_pool-constants.patch
queue-4.14/mips-use-fallback-for-random_get_entropy-instead-of-just-c0-random.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-hash-function-for-crng_slow_load.patch
queue-4.14/random-fix-typo-in-comments.patch
queue-4.14/random-remove-preempt-disabled-region.patch
queue-4.14/random-use-proper-return-types-on-get_random_-int-long-_wait.patch



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