This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: kvm-x86-speculation-disable-fill-buffer-clear-within-guests.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From foo@baz Tue Jun 14 07:09:24 PM CEST 2022 From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 20:35:15 -0700 Subject: KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill buffers. Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS. Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [cascardo: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c has been split and context adjustment at vmx_vcpu_run] [cascardo: moved functions so they are after struct vcpu_vmx definition] [cascardo: fb_clear is disabled/enabled around __vmx_vcpu_run] [cascardo: conflict context fixups] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++ 3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -115,6 +115,11 @@ * VERW clears CPU fill buffer * even on MDS_NO CPUs. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL BIT(18) /* + * MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS] + * bit available to control VERW + * behavior. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* @@ -132,6 +137,7 @@ /* SRBDS support */ #define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) +#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ static const struct { #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages; +/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */ +static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available; + static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf) { struct page *page; @@ -820,6 +823,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { */ u64 msr_ia32_feature_control; u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits; + u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl; + bool disable_fb_clear; }; enum segment_cache_field { @@ -1628,6 +1633,60 @@ static inline void __invept(unsigned lon : : "a" (&operand), "c" (ext) : "cc", "memory"); } +static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr); + if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) + vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true; + } +} + +static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */ + vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr; +} + +static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) + return; + + vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); +} + +static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available; + + /* + * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS + * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to + * execute VERW. + */ + if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) || + ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO))) + vmx->disable_fb_clear = false; +} + static struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) { int i; @@ -3700,9 +3759,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu * } break; } - ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); } + /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */ + if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) + vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx); + return ret; } @@ -6008,6 +6071,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc update_exception_bitmap(vcpu); vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid); + + vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx); } /* @@ -9783,6 +9848,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); + vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx); + asm( /* Store host registers */ "push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";" @@ -9900,6 +9967,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc #endif ); + vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx); + /* * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and @@ -12924,8 +12993,11 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void) } } + vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu)); spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu)); } --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) /* KVM does not emulate MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. */ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR; + + /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */ + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL; + return data; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are queue-4.14/x86-speculation-add-a-common-function-for-md_clear-mitigation-update.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-mmio-reuse-srbds-mitigation-for-sbds.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-mmio-add-sysfs-reporting-for-processor-mmio-stale-data.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-srbds-update-srbds-mitigation-selection.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-mmio-enable-cpu-fill-buffer-clearing-on-idle.patch queue-4.14/x86-bugs-group-mds-taa-processor-mmio-stale-data-mitigations.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-mmio-enumerate-processor-mmio-stale-data-bug.patch queue-4.14/documentation-add-documentation-for-processor-mmio-stale-data.patch queue-4.14/kvm-x86-speculation-disable-fill-buffer-clear-within-guests.patch queue-4.14/x86-speculation-mmio-add-mitigation-for-processor-mmio-stale-data.patch