This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations to the 5.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: arm64-use-the-clearbhb-instruction-in-mitigations.patch and it can be found in the queue-5.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. commit 409a01d1aff4c01ebf2a37b0b1df71b6ffdaf925 Author: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 15 18:24:15 2022 +0000 arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations commit 228a26b912287934789023b4132ba76065d9491c upstream. Future CPUs may implement a clearbhb instruction that is sufficient to mitigate SpectreBHB. CPUs that implement this instruction, but not CSV2.3 must be affected by Spectre-BHB. Add support to use this instruction as the BHB mitigation on CPUs that support it. The instruction is in the hint space, so it will be treated by a NOP as older CPUs. Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> [ modified for stable: Use a KVM vector template instead of alternatives, removed bitmap of mitigations ] Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@xxxxxxxxxx> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index 4b13739ca518..01112f9767bc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ hint #20 .endm +/* + * Clear Branch History instruction + */ + .macro clearbhb + hint #22 + .endm + /* * Speculation barrier */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 40a5e48881af..f63438474dd5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -523,6 +523,19 @@ static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope) return csv2_val == 3; } +static inline bool supports_clearbhb(int scope) +{ + u64 isar2; + + if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) + isar2 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); + else + isar2 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); + + return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar2, + ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT); +} + static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void) { return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index b35579352856..5b3bdad66b27 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ #define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF 0x1 /* id_aa64isar2 */ +#define ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT 28 #define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT 4 #define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SHIFT 0 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h index 1f65c37dc653..f64613a96d53 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { * canonical vectors. */ EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW, + + /* + * Use the ClearBHB instruction, before branching to the canonical + * vectors. + */ + EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN, #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ /* @@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors { #ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY #define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP -1 #define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW -1 +#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN -1 #endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ /* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 0f74dc2b13c0..33b33416fea4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start[]; extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end[]; extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start[]; extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start[]; +extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end[]; static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) @@ -1086,6 +1088,7 @@ static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp, * - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed * in our "loop mitigated list". * - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call. + * - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation. * - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no * software mitigation in the vectors is needed. * - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected. @@ -1226,6 +1229,9 @@ bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, if (supports_csv2p3(scope)) return false; + if (supports_clearbhb(scope)) + return true; + if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope)) return true; @@ -1266,6 +1272,8 @@ static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start) return __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end; else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start) return __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end; + else if (start == __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start) + return __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end; return NULL; } @@ -1305,6 +1313,7 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start NULL #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start NULL #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start NULL +#define __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start NULL static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { } #endif @@ -1323,6 +1332,11 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) } else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) { pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); } else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + } else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start); + this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN); + state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED; } else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 0d89d535720f..d07dadd6b8ff 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { }; static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = { + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_END, }; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index fcfbb2b009e2..296422119488 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -1074,6 +1074,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif #define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE 0 #define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP 1 #define BHB_MITIGATION_FW 2 +#define BHB_MITIGATION_INSN 3 .macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb .align 7 @@ -1090,6 +1091,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop x30 .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP + .if \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN + clearbhb + isb + .endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN + .if \kpti == 1 /* * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy @@ -1170,6 +1176,7 @@ ENTRY(tramp_vectors) #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW + generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ generate_tramp_vector kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE END(tramp_vectors) @@ -1232,6 +1239,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW + generate_el1_vector bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */ SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) .popsection diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index b59b66f1f905..99b8ecaae810 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -405,4 +405,10 @@ ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start) ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)] add sp, sp, #(8 * 2) ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end) + +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start) + esb + clearbhb + isb +ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end) #endif