From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx> commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream. Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2. Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to also show the state of the BHB mitigation. Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -93,5 +93,7 @@ void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(s enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void); +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void); + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */ --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c @@ -96,14 +96,39 @@ static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(v return ret; } +static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state) +{ + switch (bhb_state) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: + return ""; + default: + case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: + return ", but not BHB"; + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: + return ", BHB"; + } +} + ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { + enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(); + const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state); + const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening"; + switch (spectre_v2_state) { case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: - return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + /* + * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report + * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2. + */ + v2_str = "CSV2"; + fallthrough; case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str); case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE: fallthrough; default: @@ -771,6 +796,13 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task } } +static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state; + +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void) +{ + return spectre_bhb_state; +} + /* Patched to NOP when enabled */ void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from james.morse@xxxxxxx are queue-5.16/arm64-entry-add-macro-for-reading-symbol-addresses-from-the-trampoline.patch queue-5.16/arm64-use-the-clearbhb-instruction-in-mitigations.patch queue-5.16/arm64-add-percpu-vectors-for-el1.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-free-up-another-register-on-kpti-s-tramp_exit-path.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-don-t-assume-tramp_vectors-is-the-start-of-the-vectors.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-make-the-trampoline-cleanup-optional.patch queue-5.16/arm64-proton-pack-include-unprivileged-ebpf-status-in-spectre-v2-mitigation-reporting.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-add-non-kpti-__bp_harden_el1_vectors-for-mitigations.patch queue-5.16/arm64-add-id_aa64isar2_el1-sys-register.patch queue-5.16/kvm-arm64-allow-smccc_arch_workaround_3-to-be-discovered-and-migrated.patch queue-5.16/arm64-spectre-rename-spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-move-trampoline-macros-out-of-ifdef-d-section.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-allow-tramp_alias-to-access-symbols-after-the-4k-boundary.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-move-the-trampoline-data-page-before-the-text-page.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry.s-add-ventry-overflow-sanity-checks.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-add-vectors-that-have-the-bhb-mitigation-sequences.patch queue-5.16/arm64-mitigate-spectre-style-branch-history-side-channels.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-allow-the-trampoline-text-to-occupy-multiple-pages.patch queue-5.16/arm64-proton-pack-report-spectre-bhb-vulnerabilities-as-part-of-spectre-v2.patch queue-5.16/kvm-arm64-allow-indirect-vectors-to-be-used-without-spectre_v3a.patch queue-5.16/arm64-entry-make-the-kpti-trampoline-s-kpti-sequence-optional.patch