From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> commit c16bdeb5a39ffa3f32b32f812831a2092d2a3061 upstream. Solar Designer <solar@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I'm not aware of anyone actually running into this issue and reporting > it. The systems that I personally know use suexec along with rlimits > still run older/distro kernels, so would not yet be affected. > > So my mention was based on my understanding of how suexec works, and > code review. Specifically, Apache httpd has the setting RLimitNPROC, > which makes it set RLIMIT_NPROC: > > https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#rlimitnproc > > The above documentation for it includes: > > "This applies to processes forked from Apache httpd children servicing > requests, not the Apache httpd children themselves. This includes CGI > scripts and SSI exec commands, but not any processes forked from the > Apache httpd parent, such as piped logs." > > In code, there are: > > ./modules/generators/mod_cgid.c: ( (cgid_req.limits.limit_nproc_set) && ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, > ./modules/generators/mod_cgi.c: ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, > ./modules/filters/mod_ext_filter.c: rv = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, conf->limit_nproc); > > For example, in mod_cgi.c this is in run_cgi_child(). > > I think this means an httpd child sets RLIMIT_NPROC shortly before it > execs suexec, which is a SUID root program. suexec then switches to the > target user and execs the CGI script. > > Before 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec would set the flag, and the > target user's process count would be checked against RLIMIT_NPROC on > execve(). After 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec wouldn't set the > flag because setuid() is (naturally) called when the process is still > running as root (thus, has those limits bypass capabilities), and > accordingly execve() would not check the target user's process count > against RLIMIT_NPROC. In commit 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds") capable calls were added to set_user to make it more consistent with fork. Unfortunately because of call site differences those capable calls were checking the credentials of the user before set*id() instead of after set*id(). This breaks enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC for applications that set the rlimit and then call set*id() while holding a full set of capabilities. The capabilities are only changed in the new credential in security_task_fix_setuid(). The code in apache suexec appears to follow this pattern. Commit 909cc4ae86f3 ("[PATCH] Fix two bugs with process limits (RLIMIT_NPROC)") where this check was added describes the targes of this capability check as: 2/ When a root-owned process (e.g. cgiwrap) sets up process limits and then calls setuid, the setuid should fail if the user would then be running more than rlim_cur[RLIMIT_NPROC] processes, but it doesn't. This patch adds an appropriate test. With this patch, and per-user process limit imposed in cgiwrap really works. So the original use case of this check also appears to match the broken pattern. Restore the enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC by removing the bad capable checks added in set_user. This unfortunately restores the inconsistent state the code has been in for the last 11 years, but dealing with the inconsistencies looks like a larger problem. Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210907213042.GA22626@xxxxxxxxxxxx/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220212221412.GA29214@xxxxxxxxxxxx Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-1-ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx Fixes: 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds") History-Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Reviewed-by: Solar Designer <solar@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- kernel/sys.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -480,8 +480,7 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new) * failure to the execve() stage. */ if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) && - new_user != INIT_USER && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + new_user != INIT_USER) current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; else current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx are queue-5.15/ucounts-handle-wrapping-in-is_ucounts_overlimit.patch queue-5.15/ucounts-enforce-rlimit_nproc-not-rlimit_nproc-1.patch queue-5.15/ucounts-move-rlimit_nproc-handling-after-set_user.patch queue-5.15/ucounts-base-set_cred_ucounts-changes-on-the-real-user.patch queue-5.15/ucounts-in-set_cred_ucounts-assume-new-ucounts-is-non-null.patch queue-5.15/rlimit-fix-rlimit_nproc-enforcement-failure-caused-by-capability-calls-in-set_user.patch