This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: documentation-refer-to-config-randomize_base-for-kernel-address-space-randomization.patch and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 18:19:40 +0100 Subject: Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx> commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream. The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within the same sentence. Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to the config that provides that. Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits using the firmware. - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes attacks on the kernel generally more difficult. Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx are queue-5.15/mips-fix-kconfig-reference-to-phys_addr_t_64bit.patch queue-5.15/mips-add-sys_has_cpu_mips64_r5-config-for-mips-relea.patch queue-5.15/asoc-codecs-wcd938x-add-snd_soc_wcd938_sdw-to-codec-.patch queue-5.15/arm-imx-rename-debug_imx21_imx27_uart-to-debug_imx27.patch queue-5.15/asoc-uniphier-drop-selecting-non-existing-snd_soc_un.patch queue-5.15/documentation-refer-to-config-randomize_base-for-kernel-address-space-randomization.patch