This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
to the 5.10-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
documentation-refer-to-config-randomize_base-for-kernel-address-space-randomization.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.10 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it.
>From 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 18:19:40 +0100
Subject: Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx>
commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.
The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.
Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.
Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
using the firmware.
- Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lukas.bulwahn@xxxxxxxxx are
queue-5.10/mips-fix-kconfig-reference-to-phys_addr_t_64bit.patch
queue-5.10/mips-add-sys_has_cpu_mips64_r5-config-for-mips-relea.patch
queue-5.10/arm-imx-rename-debug_imx21_imx27_uart-to-debug_imx27.patch
queue-5.10/asoc-uniphier-drop-selecting-non-existing-snd_soc_un.patch
queue-5.10/documentation-refer-to-config-randomize_base-for-kernel-address-space-randomization.patch
