This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness() to the 5.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: random-fix-crash-on-multiple-early-calls-to-add_bootloader_randomness.patch and it can be found in the queue-5.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From f7e67b8e803185d0aabe7f29d25a35c8be724a78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2021 22:10:03 +0100 Subject: random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness() From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit f7e67b8e803185d0aabe7f29d25a35c8be724a78 upstream. Currently, if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled, multiple calls to add_bootloader_randomness() are broken and can cause a NULL pointer dereference, as noted by Ivan T. Ivanov. This is not only a hypothetical problem, as qemu on arm64 may provide bootloader entropy via EFI and via devicetree. On the first call to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() is executed, and if the seed is long enough, crng_init will be set to 1. On subsequent calls to add_bootloader_randomness() and then to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() will be skipped. Instead, wait_event_interruptible() and then credit_entropy_bits() will be called. If the entropy count for that second seed is large enough, that proceeds to crng_reseed(). However, both wait_event_interruptible() and crng_reseed() depends (at least in numa_crng_init()) on workqueues. Therefore, test whether system_wq is already initialized, which is a sufficient indicator that workqueue_init_early() has progressed far enough. If we wind up hitting the !system_wq case, we later want to do what would have been done there when wqs are up, so set a flag, and do that work later from the rand_initialize() call. Reported-by: Ivan T. Ivanov <iivanov@xxxxxxx> Fixes: 18b915ac6b0a ("efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness") Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> [Jason: added crng_need_done state and related logic.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/char/random.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng = * its value (from 0->1->2). */ static int crng_init = 0; +static bool crng_need_final_init = false; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; @@ -889,6 +890,38 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_ crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1; } +static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng) +{ + if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >= 2) + return; + if (!system_wq) { + /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues, + * so mark this for processing later. */ + crng_need_final_init = true; + return; + } + + invalidate_batched_entropy(); + numa_crng_init(); + crng_init = 2; + process_random_ready_list(); + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); + kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN); + pr_notice("crng init done\n"); + if (unseeded_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed " + "due to ratelimiting\n", + unseeded_warning.missed); + unseeded_warning.missed = 0; + } + if (urandom_warning.missed) { + pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed " + "due to ratelimiting\n", + urandom_warning.missed); + urandom_warning.missed = 0; + } +} + #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work) { @@ -1044,26 +1077,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); - if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); - numa_crng_init(); - crng_init = 2; - process_random_ready_list(); - wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); - pr_notice("random: crng init done\n"); - if (unseeded_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed " - "due to ratelimiting\n", - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed = 0; - } - if (urandom_warning.missed) { - pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed " - "due to ratelimiting\n", - urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed = 0; - } - } + crng_finalize_init(crng); } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, @@ -1962,6 +1976,8 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(&input_pool); init_std_data(&blocking_pool); + if (crng_need_final_init) + crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng); crng_initialize(&primary_crng); crng_global_init_time = jiffies; if (ratelimit_disable) { @@ -2493,7 +2509,8 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ - wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() || + wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, + !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() || ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count); credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are queue-5.4/random-fix-crash-on-multiple-early-calls-to-add_bootloader_randomness.patch