This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled cgroup: Use open-time credentials for process migraton perm checks to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: cgroup-use-open-time-credentials-for-process-migraton-perm-checks.patch and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From 1756d7994ad85c2479af6ae5a9750b92324685af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2022 11:02:28 -1000 Subject: cgroup: Use open-time credentials for process migraton perm checks MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx> commit 1756d7994ad85c2479af6ae5a9750b92324685af upstream. cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of the write - the PID. This currently uses current's credentials which is a potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that it created. This patch makes both cgroup2 and cgroup1 process migration interfaces to use the credentials saved at the time of open (file->f_cred) instead of current's. Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Fixes: 187fe84067bd ("cgroup: require write perm on common ancestor when moving processes on the default hierarchy") Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@xxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 7 ++++--- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -507,10 +507,11 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup1_procs_write(str goto out_unlock; /* - * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only - * need to check permissions on one of them. + * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only need + * to check permissions on one of them. Check permissions using the + * credentials from file open to protect against inherited fd attacks. */ - cred = current_cred(); + cred = of->file->f_cred; tcred = get_task_cred(task); if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) && !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) && --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -4892,6 +4892,7 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup_procs_write(stru { struct cgroup *src_cgrp, *dst_cgrp; struct task_struct *task; + const struct cred *saved_cred; ssize_t ret; bool locked; @@ -4909,9 +4910,15 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup_procs_write(stru src_cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(task, &cgrp_dfl_root); spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); - /* process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule */ + /* + * Process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule. Check + * permissions using the credentials from file open to protect against + * inherited fd attacks. + */ + saved_cred = override_creds(of->file->f_cred); ret = cgroup_attach_permissions(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp, of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb, threadgroup); + revert_creds(saved_cred); if (ret) goto out_finish; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tj@xxxxxxxxxx are queue-5.15/cgroup-allocate-cgroup_file_ctx-for-kernfs_open_file-priv.patch queue-5.15/cgroup-use-open-time-cgroup-namespace-for-process-migration-perm-checks.patch queue-5.15/cgroup-use-open-time-credentials-for-process-migraton-perm-checks.patch