This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send() to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> know about it. >From fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 09:59:02 -0400 Subject: selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send() From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream. Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected the first message in the sk_buff. Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5002,39 +5002,59 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *se static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - int err = 0; - u32 perm; + int rc = 0; + unsigned int msg_len; + unsigned int data_len = skb->len; + unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; + u32 perm; - if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); + while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) { + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data; - err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); - if (err) { - if (err == -EINVAL) { + /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink + * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus + * length fields; our solution is to follow what + * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at + * messages with length fields that are clearly junk + */ + if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len) + return 0; + + rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); + if (rc == 0) { + rc = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm); + if (rc) + return rc; + } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { + /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" - " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" - " pig=%d comm=%s\n", - sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, - secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name, - task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); - if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) - err = 0; + " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" + " pid=%d comm=%s\n", + sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, + secclass_map[sclass - 1].name, + task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); + if (selinux_enforcing && !security_get_allow_unknown()) + return rc; + rc = 0; + } else if (rc == -ENOENT) { + /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */ + rc = 0; + } else { + return rc; } - /* Ignore */ - if (err == -ENOENT) - err = 0; - goto out; + /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */ + msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len); + if (msg_len >= data_len) + return 0; + data_len -= msg_len; + data += msg_len; } - err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm); -out: - return err; + return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx are queue-4.9/selinux-properly-handle-multiple-messages-in-selinux_netlink_send.patch