Since 07 was sent out, three further issues have been raised: 1. John-Luc Bakker asked to include service URNs: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sipping/current/msg16352.html I heard no objection to this, so unless there is more discussion on the list I will not plan to discuss it during the SIPPING session next Friday and I will make the change in 08. 2. Brett Tate reminded me that, with removal of everything on PAI in responses, on the grounds of inability to authenticate responses, similar considerations apply to CANCEL and ACK, and therefore we should not allow PAI in CANCEL or ACK: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sipping/current/msg16255.html I heard no objection to this, so unless there is more discussion on the list I will not plan to discuss it during the SIPPING session next Friday and I will make the change in 08. 3. Finally there was a more heated discussion on responses between 23 and 26 October. Following a consensus call, to which there were no objections, all the material to do with PAI in responses in 06 was removed from 07. Subsequently some individuals complained, and as far as I am concerned, following discussions on and off the list, the ball was left in their court to provide text on an example method of authenticating a response (e.g., based on techniques used in 3GPP). Such text would address the AD concern that we can't say that the UAS must be authenticated without citing at least one mechanism for doing that. In the absence of such a text proposal I will not plan to discuss this topic during the SIPPING session next Friday, and, subject to the other two issues above, I will inform the chairs that I consider the draft ready to go. So please respond early in the week if you have any concerns. John _______________________________________________ Sipping mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP Use sip-implementors@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx for questions on current sip Use sip@xxxxxxxx for new developments of core SIP
