Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts

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On Mar  7, 2025 Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Create a new audit record AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS.
> An example of the MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS (1423) record is:
> 
>     type=MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS[1423]
>     msg=audit(1600880931.832:113)
>     subj_apparmor=unconfined
>     subj_smack=_
> 
> When an audit event includes a AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record
> the "subj=" field in other records in the event will be "subj=?".
> An AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is supplied when the system has
> multiple security modules that may make access decisions based
> on a subject security context.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  |  1 +
>  include/linux/security.h   |  1 +
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  1 +
>  kernel/audit.c             | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c    |  1 +
>  security/bpf/hooks.c       |  1 +
>  security/security.c        |  3 +++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c   |  1 +
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  1 +
>  9 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 090d1d3e19fe..e4d303ab1f20 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct lsm_static_calls_table {
>  struct lsm_id {
>  	const char *name;
>  	u64 id;
> +	bool subjctx;
>  };

The new field needs to be documented in the comment block for the
struct, and while I'll reserve judgement until I see the description,
I believe this field either needs to be renamed, moved elsewhere, or
simply "disappeared" in favor of something else.

> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 540894695c4b..79a9bf4a7cdd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ struct lsm_prop {
>  
>  extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
>  extern u32 lsm_active_cnt;
> +extern u32 lsm_subjctx_cnt;

I'm not loving this.  More below, but I'd really like to hide some of
this detail inside a LSM API/hook if possible.

>  extern const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[];
>  
>  /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index d9a069b4a775..5ebb5d80363d 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
>  #define AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS	1420	/* IPE denial or grant */
>  #define AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE	1421	/* IPE config change */
>  #define AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD	1422	/* IPE policy load */
> +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS	1423	/* Multiple LSM task contexts */
>  
>  #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG   1700
>  #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG    1799
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 293364bba961..59eaf69ee8ac 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
>  #include <net/netlink.h>
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
>  #include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  #include <linux/freezer.h>
>  #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
>  #include <net/netns/generic.h>
> @@ -2241,21 +2242,51 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  {
>  	struct lsm_prop prop;
>  	struct lsm_context ctx;
> +	bool space = false;
>  	int error;
> +	int i;
>  
>  	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
>  	if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, LSM_ID_UNDEF);
> -	if (error < 0) {
> -		if (error != -EINVAL)
> -			goto error_path;
> +	if (lsm_subjctx_cnt < 2) {
> +		error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, LSM_ID_UNDEF);
> +		if (error < 0) {
> +			if (error != -EINVAL)
> +				goto error_path;
> +			return 0;
> +		}
> +		audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx.context);
> +		security_release_secctx(&ctx);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> -
> -	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx.context);
> -	security_release_secctx(&ctx);
> +	/* Multiple LSMs provide contexts. Include an aux record. */
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=?");
> +	error = audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto error_path;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++) {
> +		if (!lsm_idlist[i]->subjctx)
> +			continue;
> +		error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx,
> +						   lsm_idlist[i]->id);
> +		if (error < 0) {
> +			if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
> +				continue;
> +			audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=?", space ? " " : "",
> +					 lsm_idlist[i]->name);
> +			if (error != -EINVAL)
> +				audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
> +		} else {
> +			audit_log_format(ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s", space ? " " : "",
> +					 lsm_idlist[i]->name, ctx.context);
> +			security_release_secctx(&ctx);
> +		}
> +		space = true;
> +	}
> +	audit_buffer_aux_end(ab);
>  	return 0;

I'd really like to see us develop something a bit cleaner than the
code above.  It looks like there are two things that we're currently
missing in the LSM API: a count of the number of LSMs supplying data
in a lsm_prop struct, and a mechanism to iterate through a lsm_prop
and act on each LSM's data.

As far as the count is concerned, I think we can take a similar
approach to what we do with MAX_LSM_COUNT to generate a value at
build time, for example (pardon the lazy pseudo code):

 >>> include/linux/lsm_count.h
 
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
#define SMACK_ENABLED 1,
#define SMACK_LSMPROP 1,
#else
#define SMACK_ENABLED
#define SMACK_LSMPROP
#endif

#define MAX_LSM_PROPS \
  COUNT_LSMS(         \
    SMACK_LSMPROP     \
    ...)              \

The iterator mechanism is a little more complex, but I think the
interface and resulting will be a lot cleaner, at least to in my mind.

 >>> LSM hook

int security_lsmprop_walk(void *data,
                          void (*iter)(struct lsm_id *lsm, void *data,
                                      char *secctx, u32 secid));

 >>> example audit code

struct lsmprop_walk_data {
  struct audit_buffer *ab;
  unsigned int count;
};

void audit_lsmprop_walk(struct lsm_id *lsm, void *data,
                        char *secctx, u32 secid)
{
  struct lsmprop_walk_data *walk = data;

  audit_log_format(data->ab, "%ssubj_%s=%s",
                   (data->count++ ? " " : ""),
                   lsm->name, (secctx ? secctx : "?"));
  if (secctx)
    security_release_secctx(secctx);
}

int audit_log_task_context(...)
{
  ...

  if (MAX_LSM_PROPS <= 1) {
    security_lsmprop_to_secctx(...)
    audit_log_format(...);
  } else {
    struct lsmprop_walk_data data = { .ab = ab, count = 0 };

    audit_buffer_aux_new(ab, AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS);
    security_lsmprop_walk(data, audit_lsmprop_walk);
    audit_buffer_aux_end(
  }
  
  ...
}

--
paul-moore.com




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