Re: [PATCH] selinux: Deprecate /sys/fs/selinux/user

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On Fri, Oct 4, 2024 at 12:57 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 4, 2024 at 11:53 AM Stephen Smalley
> <stephen.smalley.work@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > The only known user of this interface was libselinux and its
> > internal usage of this interface for get_ordered_context_list(3)
> > was removed in Feb 2020, with a deprecation warning added to
> > security_compute_user(3) at the same time. Add a deprecation
> > warning to the kernel and schedule it for final removal in 2025.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@xxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-user | 12 ++++++++++++
> >  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c                  |  4 ++++
> >  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-user
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-user b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-user
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..8ab7557f283f
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-user
> > @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
> > +What:          /sys/fs/selinux/user
> > +Date:          April 2005 (predates git)
> > +KernelVersion: 2.6.12-rc2 (predates git)
> > +Contact:       selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > +Description:
> > +
> > +       The selinuxfs "user" node allows userspace to request a list
> > +       of security contexts that can be reached for a given SELinux
> > +       user from a given starting context. This was used by libselinux
> > +       when various login-style programs requested contexts for
> > +       users, but libselinux stopped using it in 2020.
> > +       Kernel support will be removed no sooner than Dec 2025.
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > index e172f182b65c..8117d8f6ac2d 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > @@ -1069,6 +1069,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
> >         int rc;
> >         u32 i, len, nsids;
> >
> > +       pr_warn_once("SELinux: %s (%d) wrote to /sys/fs/selinux/user! This "
> > +               "will not be supported in the future; please update your "
> > +               "userspace.\n", current->comm, current->pid);
>
> Since this could be triggered by multiple different applications, it
> is worth using pr_warn() so users have a better list of what
> applications are causing this notice?  I understand that there is a
> risk of log spam, but considering the limited use of this API it seems
> like this is a reasonable risk?

I'd be fine switching it to pr_warn(), but in reality, I think the
only direct user was libselinux, so that's the component that actually
needs to be updated if it triggers.





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