Re: [PATCH v2] libsemanage: Preserve file context and ownership in policy store

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On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 11:11 AM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 9:29 AM Vit Mojzis <vmojzis@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > Make sure that file context (all parts) and ownership of
> > files/directories in policy store does not change no matter which user
> > and under which context executes policy rebuild.
> >
> > Fixes:
> >   # semodule -B
> >   # ls -lZ  /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files
> >
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0 421397 Jul 11 09:57 file_contexts
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0 593470 Jul 11 09:57 file_contexts.bin
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0  14704 Jul 11 09:57 file_contexts.homedirs
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0  20289 Jul 11 09:57 file_contexts.homedirs.bin
> >
> >   SELinux user changed from system_u to the user used to execute semodule
> >
> >   # capsh --user=testuser --caps="cap_dac_override,cap_chown+eip" --addamb=cap_dac_override,cap_chown -- -c "semodule -B"
> >   # ls -lZ  /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files
> >
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 testuser testuser unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0 421397 Jul 19 09:10 file_contexts
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 testuser testuser unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0 593470 Jul 19 09:10 file_contexts.bin
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 testuser testuser unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0  14704 Jul 19 09:10 file_contexts.homedirs
> > -rw-r--r--. 1 testuser testuser unconfined_u:object_r:file_context_t:s0  20289 Jul 19 09:10 file_contexts.homedirs.bin
> >
> >   Both file context and ownership changed -- causes remote login
> >   failures and other issues in some scenarios.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vit Mojzis <vmojzis@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  libsemanage/src/semanage_store.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  libsemanage/src/semanage_store.h |  1 +
> >  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/libsemanage/src/semanage_store.c b/libsemanage/src/semanage_store.c
> > index 27c5d349..12c30ad2 100644
> > --- a/libsemanage/src/semanage_store.c
> > +++ b/libsemanage/src/semanage_store.c
> > @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ typedef struct dbase_policydb dbase_t;
> >  #include "database_policydb.h"
> >  #include "handle.h"
> >
> > +#include <selinux/restorecon.h>
> >  #include <selinux/selinux.h>
> >  #include <sepol/policydb.h>
> >  #include <sepol/module.h>
> > @@ -731,7 +732,7 @@ int semanage_copy_file(const char *src, const char *dst, mode_t mode,
> >
> >         if (!mode)
> >                 mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
> > -
> > +
>
> We generally don't make unrelated whitespace changes in a patch.
>
> >         mask = umask(0);
> >         if ((out = open(tmp, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, mode)) == -1) {
> >                 umask(mask);
> > @@ -767,6 +768,8 @@ int semanage_copy_file(const char *src, const char *dst, mode_t mode,
> >         if (!retval && rename(tmp, dst) == -1)
> >                 return -1;
> >
> > +       semanage_setfiles(dst);
> > +
> >  out:
> >         errno = errsv;
> >         return retval;
> > @@ -819,6 +822,8 @@ static int semanage_copy_dir_flags(const char *src, const char *dst, int flag)
> >                         goto cleanup;
> >                 }
> >                 umask(mask);
> > +
> > +               semanage_setfiles(dst);
> >         }
> >
> >         for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
> > @@ -837,6 +842,7 @@ static int semanage_copy_dir_flags(const char *src, const char *dst, int flag)
> >                                 goto cleanup;
> >                         }
> >                         umask(mask);
> > +                       semanage_setfiles(path2);
> >                 } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) && flag == 1) {
> >                         mask = umask(0077);
> >                         if (semanage_copy_file(path, path2, sb.st_mode,
> > @@ -938,6 +944,7 @@ int semanage_mkdir(semanage_handle_t *sh, const char *path)
> >
> >                 }
> >                 umask(mask);
> > +               semanage_setfiles(path);
> >         }
> >         else {
> >                 /* check that it really is a directory */
> > @@ -1614,16 +1621,19 @@ static int semanage_validate_and_compile_fcontexts(semanage_handle_t * sh)
> >                     semanage_final_path(SEMANAGE_FINAL_TMP, SEMANAGE_FC)) != 0) {
> >                 goto cleanup;
> >         }
> > +       semanage_setfiles(semanage_final_path(SEMANAGE_FINAL_TMP, SEMANAGE_FC_BIN));
> >
> >         if (sefcontext_compile(sh,
> >                     semanage_final_path(SEMANAGE_FINAL_TMP, SEMANAGE_FC_LOCAL)) != 0) {
> >                 goto cleanup;
> >         }
> > +       semanage_setfiles(semanage_final_path(SEMANAGE_FINAL_TMP, SEMANAGE_FC_LOCAL_BIN));
> >
> >         if (sefcontext_compile(sh,
> >                     semanage_final_path(SEMANAGE_FINAL_TMP, SEMANAGE_FC_HOMEDIRS)) != 0) {
> >                 goto cleanup;
> >         }
> > +       semanage_setfiles(semanage_final_path(SEMANAGE_FINAL_TMP, SEMANAGE_FC_HOMEDIRS_BIN));
> >
> >         status = 0;
> >  cleanup:
> > @@ -3018,3 +3028,14 @@ int semanage_nc_sort(semanage_handle_t * sh, const char *buf, size_t buf_len,
> >
> >         return 0;
> >  }
> > +
> > +/* Make sure the file context and ownership of files in the policy
> > + * store does not change */
> > +void semanage_setfiles(const char *path){
> > +       /* Fix the user and role portions of the context, ignore errors
> > +        * since this is not a critical operation */
> > +       selinux_restorecon(path, SELINUX_RESTORECON_SET_SPECFILE_CTX | SELINUX_RESTORECON_IGNORE_NOENTRY);
> > +       /* Make sure "path" is owned by root */
> > +       if(geteuid() != 0 || getegid() != 0)
> > +               chown(path, 0, 0);
> > +}
>
> Arguably should check stat.st_uid/gid from stat(2) of path although
> perhaps it doesn't matter.
> Need to make sure that these paths only exist in root-owned
> directories and can't be used to trigger a chown of some other
> arbitrary file to root ownership, e.g. some suid binary.
> Maybe refuse to chown() if stat.st_mode & (S_IFREG|S_ISUID) ||
> stat.st_mode & (S_IFREG|S_ISGID)?

Sorry, I munged that - should be something like S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) &&
(sb.st_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)).
Obviously still subject to races unless you do something like fd =
open(path, O_PATH); fstat(fd, &sb); <test sb.st_mode>; fchown(fd, 0,
0);





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