Re: [PATCH v3] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section

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On 5/6/24 18:25, GUO Zihua wrote:
A panic happens in ima_match_policy:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
  ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
  process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
  ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
  ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
  ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
  ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
  ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
  path_openat+0x571/0x1720
  do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
  ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
  ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
  ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
  ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
  do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
  do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.

Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.

The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
|	Thread A	|	Thread B	|
|			|ima_match_policy	|
|			|  rcu_read_lock	|
|ima_lsm_update_rule	|			|
|  synchronize_rcu	|			|
|			|    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
|			|      sleep		|
==> synchronize_rcu returns early
|  kfree(entry)		|			|
|			|    entry = entry->next|
==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
|			|    entry->action	|
==> Accessing entry might cause panic.

To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.

Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@xxxxxxxxxx>

this looks fine
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---

v3:
   ima_lsm_copy_rule takes a GFP flag as input as well.
v2:
   Changed the audit_rule_init security hook to accept a new GFP flag, as
per Stephen's suggestion.

---
  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  2 +-
  include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++--
  kernel/auditfilter.c                |  5 +++--
  security/apparmor/audit.c           |  6 +++---
  security/apparmor/include/audit.h   |  2 +-
  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 +++++++++------
  security/security.c                 |  6 ++++--
  security/selinux/include/audit.h    |  4 +++-
  security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  5 +++--
  security/smack/smack_lsm.c          |  3 ++-
  10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 334e00efbde4..7e539f6f8c67 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-	 void **lsmrule)
+	 void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule)
  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 41a8f667bdfa..5122e3ad83b1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			     gfp_t gfp);
  int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
  int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
  void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
@@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
  #else
static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-					   void **lsmrule)
+					   void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
  {
  	return 0;
  }
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
  			entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
  			f->lsm_str = str;
  			err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
-						       (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+						       (void **)&f->lsm_rule,
+						       GFP_KERNEL);
  			/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
  			 * become valid after a policy reload. */
  			if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
  	ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
-				       (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+				       (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL);
  	/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
  	 * become valid after a policy reload. */
  	if (ret == -EINVAL) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
  	}
  }
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp)
  {
  	struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
@@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
  		return -EINVAL;
  	}
- rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp);
if (!rule)
  		return -ENOMEM;
/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */
  	rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
-				     GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
+				     gfp, true, false);
  	if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
  		int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
  		aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
  }
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
  int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
  int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  	kfree(entry);
  }
-static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+						gfp_t gfp)
  {
  	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
  	int i;
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  	 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
  	 * lsm rules can change
  	 */
-	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp);
  	if (!nentry)
  		return NULL;
@@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
  				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     gfp);
  		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
  			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
  				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  	int i;
  	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
- nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
+	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!nentry)
  		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
  		}
if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
-			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
+			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
  			if (lsm_rule) {
  				rule_reinitialized = true;
  				goto retry;
@@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
  	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
  	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
  				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
-				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+				      GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
  		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
  			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0a9a0ac3f266..4fd3c839353e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5331,15 +5331,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
   * @op: rule operator
   * @rulestr: rule context
   * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct
+ * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
   *
   * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
   *
   * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of
   *         an invalid rule.
   */
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			     gfp_t gfp)
  {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp);
  }
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
   *	@op: the operator the rule uses
   *	@rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
   *	@rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *	@gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
   *
   *	Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
   *	will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
   *	selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
   */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
+			    gfp_t gfp);
/**
   *	selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e88b1b6c4adb..ded250e525e9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3508,7 +3508,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
  	}
  }
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
  {
  	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
  	struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3549,7 +3550,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
  		return -EINVAL;
  	}
- tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp);
  	if (!tmprule)
  		return -ENOMEM;
  	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 146667937811..a4943628d75a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4696,7 +4696,8 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
   * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
   * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
   */
-static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
  {
  	struct smack_known *skp;
  	char **rule = (char **)vrule;





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