On Nov 7, 2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Before the security field of kernel objects could be shared among LSMs with > the LSM stacking feature, IMA and EVM had to rely on an alternative storage > of inode metadata. The association between inode metadata and inode is > maintained through an rbtree. > > Because of this alternative storage mechanism, there was no need to use > disjoint inode metadata, so IMA and EVM today still share them. > > With the reservation mechanism offered by the LSM infrastructure, the > rbtree is no longer necessary, as each LSM could reserve a space in the > security blob for each inode. However, since IMA and EVM share the > inode metadata, they cannot directly reserve the space for them. > > Instead, request from the 'integrity' LSM a space in the security blob for > the pointer of inode metadata (integrity_iint_cache structure). The other > reason for keeping the 'integrity' LSM is to preserve the original ordering > of IMA and EVM functions as when they were hardcoded. > > Prefer reserving space for a pointer to allocating the integrity_iint_cache > structure directly, as IMA would require it only for a subset of inodes. > Always allocating it would cause a waste of memory. > > Introduce two primitives for getting and setting the pointer of > integrity_iint_cache in the security blob, respectively > integrity_inode_get_iint() and integrity_inode_set_iint(). This would make > the code more understandable, as they directly replace rbtree operations. > > Locking is not needed, as access to inode metadata is not shared, it is per > inode. > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > security/integrity/iint.c | 71 +++++----------------------------- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 20 +++++++++- > 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c > index 882fde2a2607..a5edd3c70784 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/iint.c > +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c > @@ -231,6 +175,10 @@ static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void) > return 0; > } > > +struct lsm_blob_sizes integrity_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { > + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache *), > +}; I'll admit that I'm likely missing an important detail, but is there a reason why you couldn't stash the integrity_iint_cache struct directly in the inode's security blob instead of the pointer? For example: struct lsm_blob_sizes ... = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache), }; struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(inode) { if (unlikely(!inode->isecurity)) return NULL; return inode->i_security + integrity_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; } -- paul-moore.com