On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 5:08 AM Dmytro Maluka <dmy@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On 8/9/23 19:28, Dmytro Maluka wrote: > > So one of the questions I'm wondering about is: if Android implemented > > preventing execution of any io_uring code by non-trusted processes > > (via seccomp or any other way), how much would it help to reduce the > > risk of attacks, compared to its current SELinux based solution? > > And why exactly I'm wondering about that: AFAICT, Android folks are > concerned about the high likelihood of vulnerabilities in io_uring code > just like we (ChromeOS folks) are, and that is the main reason why > Android takes care of restricting io_uring usage in the first place. I think if you audit the io_uring syscalls and find a code path that is not already mediated by a LSM hook (potentially at an earlier point during setup / fd creation) that accesses any shared resource or performs a privileged action, we would be open to adding a LSM hook to cover that code path. But you'd have to do the work to identify and propose such cases.
