[PATCH v4 4/5] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure

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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>

Change the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM
infrastructure, in preparation for moving IMA and EVM to that
infrastructure.

This requires passing only the xattr array allocated by
security_inode_init_security(), instead of the first LSM xattr and the
place where the EVM xattr should be filled.

It also requires positioning after the last filled xattr (by checking the
xattr name), since the beginning of the xattr array is given.

If EVM is moved to the LSM infrastructure, it will use the xattr
reservation mechanism too, i.e. it positions itself in the xattr array with
the offset given by the LSM infrastructure.

Finally, make evm_inode_init_security() return value compatible with the
inode_init_security hook conventions, i.e. return -EOPNOTSUPP if it is not
setting an xattr.

EVM is a bit tricky, because xattrs is both an input and an output. If it
was just output, EVM should have returned zero if xattrs is NULL. But,
since xattrs is also input, EVM is unable to do its calculations, so return
-EOPNOTSUPP and handle this error in security_inode_init_security().

Don't change the return value in the inline function
evm_inode_init_security() in include/linux/evm.h, as the function will be
removed if EVM is moved to the LSM infrastructure.

Last note, this patch does not fix a possible crash if the xattr array is
empty (due to calling evm_protected_xattr() with a NULL argument). It will
be fixed with 'evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr', as it will
first ensure that the xattr name is not NULL before calling
evm_protected_xattr().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 include/linux/evm.h               | 12 ++++++------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
 security/security.c               |  5 ++---
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index aa63e0b3c0a2..3bb2ae9fe098 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
 extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				       const char *xattr_name);
-extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				   const struct xattr *xattr_array,
-				   struct xattr *evm);
+extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				   const struct qstr *qstr,
+				   struct xattr *xattrs);
 extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name);
 extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name);
 extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-					  const struct xattr *xattr_array,
-					  struct xattr *evm)
+static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+					  const struct qstr *qstr,
+					  struct xattr *xattrs)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 23d484e05e6f..0a312cafb7de 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -845,23 +845,29 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 /*
  * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
  */
-int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
-				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr,
+			    struct xattr *xattrs)
 {
 	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
+	struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
-	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
-		return 0;
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs ||
+	    !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
+		;
+
+	evm_xattr = xattr;
 
 	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!xattr_data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b62f192de6da..999102101a75 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1170,9 +1170,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		}
 	}
 
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,
-				      new_xattrs + cur_xattrs);
-	if (ret)
+	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs);
+	if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
-- 
2.25.1




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