Re: LSM stacking in next for 6.1?

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On 10/31/2022 3:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2022/10/31 1:37, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> You have only three choices:
>>>
>>>  (1) allow assigning LSM ID integer value to all LSM modules (regardless of
>>>      whether that module was merged into upstream kernel)
>> We are not hardware manufacturers.
>>
> Excuse me? We are not talking about whether we are hardware manufacturers.
> We are talking about the policy for assigning identifier.
>
> I don't like how LSM IDs are assigned, for Casey said
>
>   >> If the upstream kernel assigns an LSM id for all LSM modules including out-of-tree
>   >> and/or private LSM modules (that's why I described that the upstream kernel behaves
>   >> as if a DNS registerer), we can assign LSM id = 100 to "belllapadula" from A and
>   >> LSM id = 101 to "belllapadula" from B, and both "belllapadula" modules can work
>   >> without conflicts by using LSM id. Of course, this implies that we need to preserve
>   >> unused space in lsm_idlist[LSMID_ENTRIES] etc. for such LSM modules (if we use
>   >> fixed-sized array rather than a linked list).
>   > 
>   > Of course the upstream kernel isn't going to have LSM IDs for out-of-tree
>   > security modules. That's one of many reasons loadable modules are going to
>   > have to be treated differently from built-in modules, if they're allowed
>   > at all.
>
> at https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7263e155-9024-0508-370c-72692901b326@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and
> Paul confirmed
>
>   >> Currently anyone can start writing new LSM modules using name as identifier. But
>   >> you are trying to forbid using name as identifier, and trying to force using integer
>   >> as identifier, but that integer will not be provided unless new LSM modules get
>   >> upstream.
>   > 
>   > That is correct.  In order to have a LSM identifier token the LSM must
>   > be upstream.
>
> at https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHC9VhT2Azg1F-G3RQ4xL7JgA3OAtHafzS1_nvUyEUFsCJ9+SA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx .
>
> If we can agree that the upstream kernel never refuse to assign LSM IDs to whatever
> LSM modules, I'm OK that we introduce LSM ID integer value itself.
>
>
>
> My next concern is that we are trying to use fixed sized capacity as LSMID_ENTRIES,
> commented
>
>   On 2022/10/13 19:04, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>   > On 2022/09/28 4:53, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>   >> +	if (lsm_id > LSMID_ENTRIES)
>   >> +		panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
>   > 
>   > I'm not happy with LSMID_ENTRIES. This is a way towards forever forbidding LKM-based LSMs.
>
> at https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9907d724-4668-cd50-7454-1a8ca86542b0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx , for
>
>   struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSMID_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init;
>
> may cause out-of-tree LSM modules to fail to use the slot.
>
> It is a strange hack that users have to enable in-tree LSM modules or rewrite the
> definition of LSMID_ENTRIES in order to use out-of-tree (either built-in or loadable)
> LSM modules, for LSMID_ENTRIES is defined based on only in-tree LSM modules.
>
>   #define LSMID_ENTRIES ( \
>         1 + /* capabilities */ \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
>         (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
>
> Although built-in out-of-tree LSM modules would be able to rewrite LSMID_ENTRIES definition
> because users will rebuild the whole kernel, loadable out-of-tree LSM modules would not be
> able to rewrite LSMID_ENTRIES definition because users will not rebuild the whole kernel.
> It is still effectively a lock out for loadable out-of-tree LSM modules even if the problem
> of assigning LSM ID integer value is solved.

Propose an implementation of security module loading. If LSMID_ENTRIES is a problem
I will help you resolve the issue. My bet is that there will be an easy solution. It
may be as simple as adding (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADABLE) ? 1 : 0) + \ to the
code referenced above. But I can't say until I see how you're going to address all
of the real issues.




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