On Fri, Jul 8, 2022 at 12:11 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 7/8/2022 7:01 AM, Frederick Lawler wrote: > > On 7/8/22 7:10 AM, Christian Göttsche wrote: > >> ,On Fri, 8 Jul 2022 at 00:32, Frederick Lawler <fred@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > >> wrote: ... > >> Also I think the naming scheme is <object>_<verb>. > > > > That's a good call out. I was originally hoping to keep the > > security_*() match with the hook name matched with the caller function > > to keep things all aligned. If no one objects to renaming the hook, I > > can rename the hook for v3. No objection from me. [Sorry for the delay, the last week or two has been pretty busy.] > >> III. > >> > >> Maybe even attach a security context to namespaces so they can be > >> further governed? > > That would likely add confusion to the existing security module namespace > efforts. SELinux, Smack and AppArmor have all developed namespace models. I'm not sure I fully understand what Casey is saying here as SELinux does not yet have an established namespace model to the best of my understanding, but perhaps we are talking about different concepts for the word "namespace"? >From a SELinux perspective, if we are going to control access to a namespace beyond simple creation, we would need to assign the namespace a label (inherited from the creating process). Although that would need some discussion among the SELinux folks as this would mean treating a userns as a proper system entity from a policy perspective which is ... interesting. > That, or it could replace the various independent efforts with a single, > unified security module namespace effort. We've talked about this before and I just don't see how that could ever work, the LSM implementations are just too different to do namespacing at the LSM layer. If a LSM is going to namespace themselves, they need the ability to define what that means without having to worry about what other LSMs want to do. -- paul-moore.com
