On 2/28/22 8:50 PM, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> There are a few places where we test the current process' capability set
> to decide if we're going to be more or less generous with resource
> acquisition for a system call. If the process doesn't have the
> capability, we can continue the call, albeit in a degraded mode.
>
> These are /not/ the actual security decisions, so it's not proper to use
> capable(), which (in certain selinux setups) causes audit messages to
> get logged. Switch them to has_capability_noaudit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks Darrick. This looks technically correct to me as well.
You might want to add a:
Fixes: 7317a03df703f ("xfs: refactor inode ownership change transaction/inode/quota allocation idiom")
because I /think/ that's the commit that moved the capable() checks out
from under quota tests, and made the problem more visible.
And maybe:
Fixes: ea9a46e1c4925 ("xfs: only return detailed fsmap info if the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN")
as well?
It's not strictly fixing the former; AFAICT the problem existed when quota was
enabled already, so I'll leave all that to your discretion.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Thanks,
-Eric
