Re: [PATCH] selinux-notebook: describe nosuid and NNP transitions

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On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 2:09 PM Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 18.6.2021 6.50, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Sat, Jun 12, 2021 at 4:14 AM Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> Describe cases where nosuid_transition or nnp_transition are needed.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >>   src/computing_security_contexts.md | 9 ++++++++-
> >>   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/src/computing_security_contexts.md b/src/computing_security_contexts.md
> >> index bb946b5..7bd1d87 100644
> >> --- a/src/computing_security_contexts.md
> >> +++ b/src/computing_security_contexts.md
> >> @@ -84,7 +84,14 @@ Processes inherit their security context as follows:
> >>      *default_type* (policy version 28) or if a security-aware process,
> >>      by calling ***setexeccon**(3)* if permitted by policy prior to
> >>      invoking exec.
> >> -3. At any time, a security-aware process may invoke ***setcon**(3)* to
> >> +3. If the file system is mounted with *nosuid* flag, type transitions
> >> +   require permission *nosuid_transition*. If the thread has
> >> +   *no_new_privs* attribute set, the transition requires
> >> +   *nnp_transition*. For both transitions, policy capability
> >> +   *nnp_nosuid_transition* is also required. See also
> >> +   [**Linux Security Module and SELinux**](lsm_selinux.md#linux-security-module-and-selinux)
> >> +   section.
> >
> > Thanks for adding this text, however I might suggest the following changes:
> >
> > "If the loaded SELinux policy has the nnp_nosuid_transition policy
> > capability enabled there are potentially two additional permissions
> > that are required to permit a domain transition: nosuid_transition for
> > nosuid mounted filesystems, and nnp_transition for for threads with
> > the no_new_privs flag."
> >
> > ... does that make sense?
>
> Yes. I'd then add:
>
> "If nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability is disabled, such domain
> transitions are denied."

In most cases, yes that is correct, but bounded domain transitions are
still allowed in the case where the nnp_nosuid_transition policy
capability is not enabled.

Did you want to respin the patch with the above changes?

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com



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