Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants

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On 2021-03-18 16:42, Paul Moore wrote:
> Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
> hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
> credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
> callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
> a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
> credentials.
> 
> This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
> the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
> for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
> 
>   void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
> 				   u32 *secid);
>   void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
> 				  u32 *secid);
> 
> While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
> variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
> ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
> both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
> the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
> LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
> implementations and return the correct credentials.
> 
> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (IMA)
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Audit: Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>

> ---
>  drivers/android/binder.c              |   11 ++++++++++-
>  include/linux/cred.h                  |    2 +-
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h         |    5 ++++-
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h             |   12 +++++++++---
>  include/linux/security.h              |   10 ++++++++--
>  kernel/audit.c                        |    4 ++--
>  kernel/auditfilter.c                  |    3 ++-
>  kernel/auditsc.c                      |    8 ++++----
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                  |    3 ++-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c     |    2 +-
>  net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h          |    2 +-
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c               |    3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |    2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |   14 +++++++-------
>  security/security.c                   |   13 ++++++++++---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c              |    3 ++-
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c            |    3 ++-
>  17 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>  		u32 secid;
>  		size_t added_size;
>  
> -		security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> +		/*
> +		 * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
> +		 * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
> +		 * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
> +		 * are safe to access.  The downside is that if a task is
> +		 * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
> +		 * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
> +		 * case well anyway.
> +		 */
> +		security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
>  		ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
>  		if (ret) {
>  			return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
> index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cred.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cred.h
> @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct cred {
>  	struct key	*request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> -	void		*security;	/* subjective LSM security */
> +	void		*security;	/* LSM security */
>  #endif
>  	struct user_struct *user;	/* real user ID subscription */
>  	struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old,
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
> -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj,
> +	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
> +	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -707,9 +707,15 @@
>   *	@p.
>   *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> - * @task_getsecid:
> - *	Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
> - *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
> + * @task_getsecid_subj:
> + *	Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
> + *	and return it in @secid.  Special care must be taken to ensure that @p
> + *	is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access
> + *	to @p.
> + *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> + * @task_getsecid_obj:
> + *	Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p
> + *	and return it in @secid.
>   *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
>   *
>   * @task_setnice:
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -414,7 +414,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
>  int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
>  int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
>  int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
>  int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
> @@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	*secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  {
>  	*secid = 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>  	int error;
>  	u32 sid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid);
>  	if (!sid)
>  		return 0;
>  
> @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  			audit_sig_uid = auid;
>  		else
>  			audit_sig_uid = uid;
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid);
>  	}
>  
>  	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
>  			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
>  				if (f->lsm_rule) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid_subj(current,
> +								    &sid);
>  					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
>  						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
>  				}
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  			   logged upon error */
>  			if (f->lsm_rule) {
>  				if (need_sid) {
> -					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +					security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid);
>  					need_sid = 0;
>  				}
>  				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> @@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>  	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
>  	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
>  	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  }
>  
> @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
>  		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -		security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
>  		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
>  	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
>  	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
>  	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> -	security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> +	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
>  	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
>  	axp->pid_count++;
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair)
>  
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc)
> -BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
>  	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
>  	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
>  	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid);
>  	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
>  	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
>  
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
>  static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
>  {
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid);
>  	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
>  	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>  	if (!ima_appraise)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
>  				mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
>  	u32 secid;
>  
>  	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
>  					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
>  	}
> @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
>  	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
>  	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
>  				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
> @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
>  				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
>  	if (ret)
> @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
>  	u32 secid;
>  
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
>  				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
>  					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
> @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
>  
>  	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
>  				   0, MAY_READ, func);
>  }
> @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  	}
>  
>  	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> -	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
>  				   MAY_READ, func);
>  }
> @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
>  	 * buffer measurements.
>  	 */
>  	if (func) {
> -		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> +		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
>  		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
>  					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
>  					func_data);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
>  	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
>  }
>  
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
>  {
>  	*secid = 0;
> -	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
> +	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid);
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj);
> +
> +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +	*secid = 0;
> +	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
>  
>  int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
> 
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@xxxxxxxxxx
> https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
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