On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 10:30 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 09:53:21AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 24, 2021 at 4:59 PM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though > > > its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in > > > attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, > > > it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation. > > > > > > SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current > > > task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission > > > ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means > > > that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored > > > generates a bogus permission check and audit record. > > > > > > Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when > > > its result would be honored. > > > > > > Fixes: b0c8fdc7fdb7 ("lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode") > > > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > kernel/events/core.c | 12 ++++++------ > > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > Perf/core folks, do you want to pull this in via your tree? If I > > don't hear anything in the next day I'll pull this in via the > > selinux/next tree. > > > > Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Ah, fell in the cracks... I've no idea what Changelog is trying to tell > me. It is pure gibberish to me. But the patch seems harmless enough to me. > > Let me queue it then. Great, thanks. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com