On Thu, Dec 10, 2020 at 10:29:02AM +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > On Thu, Dec 10, 2020 at 3:40 AM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 9, 2020 at 10:37 AM James Carter <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2020 at 6:45 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 12:17 PM James Carter <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 9:45 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi everyone, > > > > > > > > > > > > In [1] we ran into a problem with the current handling of filesystem > > > > > > labeling rules. Basically, it is only possible to specify either > > > > > > genfscon or fs_use_xattr for a given filesystem, but in the case of > > > > > > virtiofs, certain mounts may support security xattrs, while other ones > > > > > > may not. > > > > > > > > > > > > So we can't use the xattr support by adding fs_use_xattr virtiofs > > > > > > (...); to the policy, because then a non-xattr mount will fail > > > > > > (SELinux does a mount-time check on the root inode to make sure that > > > > > > the xattr handler works), but we also don't want to stay on genfscon, > > > > > > because then we can't relabel files. > > > > > > > > > > > > So my question is how to best address this? One option is to use a > > > > > > similar "hack" as for cgroupfs; i.e. do a kind of mixed genfs-xattr > > > > > > labeling, but that's ugly and requires hard-coding another FS name in > > > > > > the selinux code. The only other alternative I could come up with is > > > > > > to add a new FS labeling statement that would specify some kind of > > > > > > mixed genfscon / fs_use_xattr behavior. That would be a better > > > > > > long-term solution, but leads to more questions on how such statement > > > > > > should actually work... Should it work the cgroupfs way, giving a > > > > > > default label to everything and allowing to set/change labels via > > > > > > xattrs? Or should it rather just detect xattrs support and switch > > > > > > between SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR and SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS behavior based > > > > > > on that? In the latter case, should the statement specify two contexts > > > > > > (one for fs_use_xattr and another one for genfscon) or just one for > > > > > > both behaviors? > > > > > > > > > > I don't think adding a new statement is necessary. It seems like > > > > > allowing both fs_use_xattr and genfscon rules for the filesystem in > > > > > policy and then using the fs_use_xattr rule if xattrs are supported > > > > > while falling back to the genfscon rule if they are not would do what > > > > > you need. > > > > > > > > That seems reasonable to me so long as this ambiguity is okay with the > > > > folks who do policy analysis. Thinking quickly I'm not sure why it > > > > would be a problem, but the thought did occur while I was typing up > > > > this reply ... > > > > > > I don't think that it would cause a problem with policy analysis. I > > > think that you would just assume the genfscon rule is being used, > > > since it is less fine-grained. It wouldn't be much different from how > > > booleans are handled. > > > > Makes sense to me. Thanks Jim. > > Okay, so I'll look into switching between use_xattr and use_genfs > based on the availability of xattr support and the presence of > corresponding rules in the policy. Thanks everyone for the fruitful > discussion! Hi Ondrej, So this is now purely a policy change and no changes required in kernel? If yes, then the patch Dan Walsh proposed, is that good enough or it needs to be done in a different way. Thanks Vivek
