Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] libselinux: Revise userspace AVC avc_log() for auditable events.

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On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 11:04 AM Chris PeBenito
<chpebeni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 9/15/20 10:43 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 10:33 AM Chris PeBenito
> > <chpebeni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 9/15/20 9:34 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 9:11 AM Chris PeBenito
> >>> <chpebeni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> diff --git a/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c b/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c
> >>>> index 572b2159..35ea59b6 100644
> >>>> --- a/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c
> >>>> +++ b/libselinux/src/avc_internal.c
> >>>> @@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ int avc_process_setenforce(int enforcing)
> >>>>           int rc = 0;
> >>>>
> >>>>           avc_log(SELINUX_SETENFORCE,
> >>>> -               "%s:  received setenforce notice (enforcing=%d)\n",
> >>>> +               "%s:  op=setenforce lsm=selinux_uavc enforcing=%d res=1",
> >>>>                   avc_prefix, enforcing);
> >>>>           if (avc_setenforce)
> >>>>                   goto out;
> >>>>           avc_enforcing = enforcing;
> >>>>           if (avc_enforcing && (rc = avc_ss_reset(0)) < 0) {
> >>>>                   avc_log(SELINUX_ERROR,
> >>>> -                       "%s:  cache reset returned %d (errno %d)\n",
> >>>> +                       "%s:  op=cache_reset lsm=selinux_uavc rc=%d errno=%d res=0",
> >>>>                           avc_prefix, rc, errno);
> >>>
> >>> If we do this at all, I would think the op= would still be setenforce
> >>> and this would just be an error for it.
> >>
> >> At this point we already audited success for the setenforce operation.  Wouldn't
> >> it be confusing to have a op=setenforce res=1 and then immediately op=setenforce
> >> res=0?
> >
> > Yes.  On second thought, I don't think any of the SELINUX_ERROR
> > messages are intended for audit and since that is already a different
> > type value, the callbacks can already redirect those to stderr or
> > syslog as appropriate instead of audit.
>
> Are the typebounds and validatetrans in UAVC passed to the kernel for
> evaluation? The kernel audits failures on those as SELINUX_ERR.  If the UAVC
> handles them itself, it seems that those failures should be audited as
> USER_SELINUX_ERR.

The userspace AVC defers all of the security_compute_av() logic to the kernel.



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