29.08.2020 19:42, Casey Schaufler пишет: > On 8/29/2020 4:08 AM, Mikhail Novosyolov wrote: >> Hello everyone, >> >> We have been thinking on such problem: read access to a file may be restricted with SELinux MCS/MLS, especially MLS/MCS. >> If a file with restricted access is inside a directory without restricted access, its name is readable. >> Name of the file may be used to store some "secret" information. >> Some system directories, e.g. /var/tmp, are writable for multiple users, and they may use it to exchange secret information, >> bypassing restrictions. >> >> Is there a way to restrict access to names of such files? > TL;DR - No > > This is probably the oldest active question in the history > of UNIX/Linux security. In the late 1980's it arose many times > in the process of system security evaluations. Because the > name of a file is data in the directory, and not an attribute > of the file in UNIX/Linux filesystems, access to it is controlled > by access to the directory. > > There was initially much crying and gnashing of teeth about this > in the evaluation community. Especially with regard to /tmp. > SELinux (and Smack, and B&L systems from the old days) have > explicit policies controlling how files can be created in > directories such that you can read the directory but not the > file attributes. While this can't prevent creating a file named > launch-the-missiles-at-noon, it provides accountability. Very interesting, thanks.But are there technical restrictions to implement hiding names of files? Let's assume that we will be OK with performance penalty of directory listing because of checking access rights to each file inside the directory. Were there any attempts to implement this?
