Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix a race condition in security_read_policy()

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On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 7:39 PM Stephen Smalley
<stephen.smalley.work@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 11:47 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > In security_read_policy(), the policy length is computed using
> > security_policydb_len(), which does a separate transaction, and then
> > another transaction is done to write the policydb into a buffer of this
> > length.
> >
> > The bug is that the policy might be re-loaded in between the two
> > transactions and so the length can be wrong. In case the new length is
> > lower than the old length, the length is corrected at the end of the
> > function. In case the new length is higher than the old one, an error is
> > returned.
> >
> > Fix it by doing everything in a single transaction and getting the
> > length directly from policydb instead of calling
> > security_policydb_len().
> >
> > Fixes: cee74f47a6ba ("SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernel")
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/ss/services.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
> >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > index a48fc1b337ba9..ab4de2a01634a 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > @@ -3842,22 +3842,25 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
> >                          void **data, size_t *len)
> >  {
> >         int rc;
> > +       struct policydb *policydb;
> >         struct policy_file fp;
> >
> >         if (!selinux_initialized(state))
> >                 return -EINVAL;
> >
> > -       *len = security_policydb_len(state);
> > +       read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
> > +       policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb;
> >
> > +       *len = policydb->len;
> >         *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
>
> I don't believe you can hold a read_lock() across a vmalloc.  That's
> why this is done the way it is now.

Fair point. Then I guess the only option is to keep retrying the
allocation until the allocated size is >= the size we are about to
write. I'll send a revised patch soon.

>
> > -       if (!*data)
> > -               return -ENOMEM;
> > -
> > -       fp.data = *data;
> > -       fp.len = *len;
> > +       if (!*data) {
> > +               rc = -ENOMEM;
> > +       } else {
> > +               fp.data = *data;
> > +               fp.len = *len;
> >
> > -       read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
> > -       rc = policydb_write(&state->ss->policy->policydb, &fp);
> > +               rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp);
> > +       }
> >         read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
> >
> >         if (rc)
> > --
> > 2.26.2
> >
>

--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Platform Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.




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