On 8/5/20 9:14 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
On 2020-08-05 09:07:48, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 8/5/20 8:45 AM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
On 2020-08-05 08:36:40, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 8/4/2020 6:14 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 8/4/20 6:04 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 8/4/2020 5:43 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured.
Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to
attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies
and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies
and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by
malware by exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or modified through some
inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would
enable an attestation service to better assess the state of the system.
I still wonder why you're calling this an LSM change/feature when
all the change is in IMA and SELinux. You're not putting anything
into the LSM infrastructure, not are you using the LSM infrastructure
to achieve your ends. Sure, you *could* support other security modules
using this scheme, but you have a configuration dependency on
SELinux, so that's at best going to be messy. If you want this to
be an LSM "feature" you need to use the LSM hooking mechanism.
I'm not objecting to the feature. It adds value. But as you've
implemented it it is either an IMA extension to SELinux, or an
SELiux extension to IMA. Could AppArmor add hooks for this without
changing the IMA code? It doesn't look like it to me.
The check in IMA to allow the new IMA hook func LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY when SELinux is enabled is just because SELinux is the only security module using these hooks now.
To enable AppArmor, for instance, to use the new IMA hooks to measure state and policy would just require adding the check for CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR. Other than that, there are no IMA changes needed to support AppArmor or other such security modules.
This is exactly what I'm objecting to. What if a system has both SELinux
and AppArmor compiled in? What if it has both enabled?
The SELinux state and policy would be measured but the AppArmor
state/policy would be silently ignored. This isn't ideal as the IMA
policy author would need to read the kernel code to figure out which
LSMs are going to be measured.
Tyler - I am not sure why AppArmor state\policy would be ignored when both
SELinux and AppArmor are enabled. Could you please clarify?
I think Casey is talking about now (when AppArmor is not supported by
this feature) and you're talking about the future (when AppArmor may be
supported by this feature).
Got it - thanks for clarifying.
But with the current code if SELinux is enabled on the system, but
AppArmor is not and the IMA policy contains "measure func=LSM_STATE"
then the policy will be rejected as "-EINVAL".
So the policy author would get a feedback even now.
Correct me if I am wrong.
-lakshmi
