Hi, Is there anything else that could be done from my side to move this forward? Thanks, Alexey On 30.04.2020 10:06, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Changes in v3: > - mention "CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN" instead of sole CAP_PERFMON or > CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the docs and messages to support use case > of newer Perf tool on kernel w/o CAP_PERFMON > - reverted double new line in "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n" > - updated security.txt content with new messages wording > > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/66f2975b-4a69-b428-7dc5-d9aa40b3c673@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > Changes in v2: > - implemented minor doc and code changes to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN > with CAP_PERFMON capability; > - introduced Perf doc file with instructions on how to enable and use > perf_event LSM hooks for mandatory access control to perf_event_open() > syscall; > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b8a0669e-36e4-a0e8-fd35-3dbd890d2170@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ > > repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux.git perf/core > sha1: ee097e8ee56f8867cbbf45fe2a06f6b9e660c39c > > > Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify > in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced > SELinux policy settings. See new added security.txt file for exact steps > how the changes look like and how to test the patch set. > > --- > Alexey Budankov (3): > perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed > perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control > perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues > > tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt | 2 +- > tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++ > tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 +- > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 39 ++-- > 4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt >
