On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 05:01:55PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
> use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion
> of security "contexts".
>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
-Kees
> ---
> security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 84f33bd4990a..b7c2ed1eee42 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -769,9 +769,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
> return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check
> + * @from: source of the transaction
> + * @to: destination of the transaction
> + *
> + * Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then
> + * call the security module hooks.
> + *
> + * Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the
> + * result of the security module checks.
> + */
> int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
> struct task_struct *to)
> {
> + int from_display = lsm_task_display(from);
> + int to_display = lsm_task_display(to);
> +
> + /*
> + * If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has
> + * an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot.
> + *
> + * This is currently only required if the server has requested
> + * peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of
> + * the binder driver detail here.
> + */
> + if (from_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + from_display = 0;
> + if (to_display == LSMBLOB_INVALID)
> + to_display = 0;
> + if (from_display != to_display)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
> }
>
> --
> 2.24.1
>
--
Kees Cook
