Re: [PATCH] selinux: reorder hooks to make runtime disable less broken

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 12/10/2019 11:29 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 6:19 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 12/9/19 2:57 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
>>>> Commit b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") switched the LSM
>>>> infrastructure to use per-hook lists, which meant that removing the
>>>> hooks for a given module was no longer atomic. Even though the commit
>>>> clearly documents that modules implementing runtime revmoval of hooks
>>>> (only SELinux attempts this madness) need to take special precautions to
>>>> avoid race conditions, SELinux has never addressed this.
>>>>
>>>> By inserting an artificial delay between the loop iterations of
>>>> security_delete_hooks() (I used 100 ms), booting to a state where
>>>> SELinux is enabled, but policy is not yet loaded, and running these
>>>> commands:
>>>>
>>>>      while true; do ping -c 1 <some IP>; done &
>>>>      echo -n 1 >/sys/fs/selinux/disable
>>>>      kill %1
>>>>      wait
>>>>
>>>> ...I was able to trigger NULL pointer dereferences in various places. I
>>>> also have a report of someone getting panics on a stock RHEL-8 kernel
>>>> after setting SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config and rebooting
>>>> (without adding "selinux=0" to kernel command-line).
>>>>
>>>> Reordering the SELinux hooks such that those that allocate structures
>>>> are removed last seems to prevent these panics. It is very much possible
>>>> that this doesn't make the runtime disable completely race-free, but at
>>>> least it makes the operation much less fragile.
>>>>
>>>> An alternative (and safer) solution would be to add NULL checks to each
>>>> hook, but doing this just to support the runtime disable hack doesn't
>>>> seem to be worth the effort...
>>> Personally, I would prefer to just get rid of runtime disable
>>> altogether; it also precludes making the hooks read-only after
>>> initialization.  IMHO, selinux=0 is the proper way to disable SELinux if
>>> necessary.  I believe there is an open bugzilla on Fedora related to
>>> this issue, since runtime disable was originally introduced for Fedora.
>> I, too, would like to see it gone, but removing it immediately would
>> likely cause issues for existing users (see [1]) ...
>>
>> [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1430944#c2
> For the record, and for those who didn't click on the RHBZ link above,
> I'm a big fan of getting rid of SELinux's runtime disable but concede
> that it must be done in such a way to as not horribly break userspace.

Is there some reason that changing the "disable SELinux" option
has to remove the hooks? Why can't it set selinux_enabled to 0
and be done with it?




[Index of Archives]     [Selinux Refpolicy]     [Linux SGX]     [Fedora Users]     [Fedora Desktop]     [Yosemite Photos]     [Yosemite Camping]     [Yosemite Campsites]     [KDE Users]     [Gnome Users]

  Powered by Linux