On 10/30/19 6:19 AM, Jeff Vander Stoep wrote:
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
hashtable which improves cache-miss reverese-lookup times from
O(n) to O(1) and maintains the same performance as a reverse
cache hit.
This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.
The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.
This change also maintains the improvement introduced in commit
ee1a84fd which removed the need to keep the current sidtab locked
during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic locking of
the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab entries
are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored in the
sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
hashtable to reduce memory usage.
This bug was reported by:
- Stephen Smally on the selinux bug tracker.
BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37
- Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker.
Bug: 140252993
"During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users
many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over
20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over
~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,
making perf benchmarks unreliable."
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 +++
security/selinux/ss/context.h | 9 +
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 81 +++++---
security/selinux/ss/services.h | 4 +-
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 283 ++++++++++++++++------------
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 20 +-
8 files changed, 283 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ae840634e3c7..8c0dbbd076c6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -395,5 +395,6 @@ extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
+extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page);
#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index ee94fa469c29..ebdec88d9ccb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1482,6 +1482,32 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
return length;
}
+static ssize_t sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ length = security_sidtab_hash_stats(state, page);
+ if (length >= 0)
+ length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page,
+ length);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
.read = sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
.write = sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
@@ -1572,6 +1598,7 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
{ "cache_threshold",
&sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+ { "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
Not sure that this belongs under /sys/fs/selinux/avc versus top-level or
a new sidtab dir since the sidtab is not part of the AVC. Also,
checkpatch.pl whines about using S_IRUGO and prefers octal so maybe we
should be using octal for new files (@paul)?
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 513e67f48878..01fea944177d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct context {
u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
struct mls_range range;
char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+ u32 hash; /* a hash of the string representation */
};
static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
@@ -168,6 +169,7 @@ static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
kfree(dst->str);
return rc;
}
+ dst->hash = src->hash;
return 0;
}
@@ -182,6 +184,8 @@ static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
{
+ if (c1->hash && c2->hash && (c1->hash != c2->hash))
+ return 0;
if (c1->len && c2->len)
return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
if (c1->len || c2->len)
@@ -192,5 +196,10 @@ static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
}
+static inline unsigned int context_compute_hash(const char *s)
+{
+ return full_name_hash(NULL, s, strlen(s));
+}
+
#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index e20624a68f5d..e369b0092cdf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -878,6 +878,11 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
sidtab_destroy(s);
goto out;
}
+ rc = context_add_hash(p, &c->context[0]);
+ if (rc) {
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
+ goto out;
+ }
rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a5813c7629c1..29076c15cdf7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1257,6 +1257,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page)
+{
+ return sidtab_hash_stats(state->ss->sidtab, page);
+}
Should we be taking the policy read lock to avoid interleaving with
sidtab replacement on policy reload?
+
const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
{
if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
@@ -1384,6 +1389,8 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
int rc = 0;
context_init(ctx);
+ /* hash the string before it gets mutated */
+ ctx->hash = context_compute_hash(scontext);
/* Parse the security context. */
@@ -1442,6 +1449,7 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
+
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc)
Try to avoid unrelated whitespace changes.
@@ -1449,6 +1457,42 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
return rc;
}
+int context_add_hash(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *str;
+ int len;
+
+ if (context->str) {
+ context->hash = context_compute_hash(context->str);
+ } else {
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context,
+ &str, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ context->hash = context_compute_hash(str);
+ kfree(str);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct context *context, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
+ struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+ if (!context->hash) {
+ rc = context_add_hash(policydb, context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, context, sid);
+}
+
static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
@@ -1501,7 +1545,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
str = NULL;
} else if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &context, sid);
context_destroy(&context);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
@@ -1805,7 +1849,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &newcontext, out_sid);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcontext);
@@ -2033,6 +2077,10 @@ static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p)
goto bad;
}
+ rc = context_add_hash(args->newp, newc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
return 0;
bad:
/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
@@ -2280,9 +2328,7 @@ int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (c) {
if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -2374,9 +2420,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (c) {
if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -2416,14 +2460,10 @@ int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (c) {
if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[1],
- &c->sid[1]);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[1], &c->sid[1]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -2601,7 +2641,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
&usercon))
continue;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &usercon, &sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
if (mynel < maxnel) {
@@ -2672,7 +2712,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 *sid)
{
struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
int len;
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
@@ -2707,7 +2746,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
goto out;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -2770,8 +2809,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
if (c) {
sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
@@ -3026,8 +3064,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
goto out_unlock;
}
}
-
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &newcon, new_sid);
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
context_destroy(&newcon);
@@ -3620,7 +3657,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
goto out_free;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+ rc = context_to_sid(state, &ctx_new, sid);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index 9a36de860368..fc40640a9725 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
#include "policydb.h"
-#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "context.h"
/* Mapping for a single class */
struct selinux_mapping {
@@ -39,4 +39,6 @@ void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
struct avtab_node *node);
+int context_add_hash(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *context);
+
#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 7d49994e8d5f..e4710f32b6d9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -23,23 +23,32 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
- /* max count is SIDTAB_MAX so valid index is always < SIDTAB_MAX */
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++)
- s->rcache[i] = SIDTAB_MAX;
-
for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
s->isids[i].set = 0;
s->count = 0;
s->convert = NULL;
+ hash_init(s->context_to_sid);
spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
}
+static u32 context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
+{
+ struct sidtab_node *node;
+
+ hash_for_each_possible(s->context_to_sid, node, list, context->hash) {
+ if (context_cmp(node->context, context))
+ return node->sid;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
{
struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry;
+ struct sidtab_node *node = NULL;
int rc;
if (sid == 0 || sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
@@ -52,9 +61,57 @@ int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
return rc;
entry->set = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Multiple initial sids may map to the same context. Check that this
+ * context is not already represented in the context_to_sid hashtable
+ * to avoid duplicate entries and long linked lists upon hash
+ * collision.
+ */
+ if (!context_to_sid(s, context)) {
+ node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sidtab_node), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!node)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ node->sid = sid;
+ node->context = &entry->context;
+ hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &node->list, context->hash);
+ }
+
return 0;
}
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page)
+{
+ int i;
+ int chain_len = 0;
+ int slots_used = 0;
+ int entries = 0;
+ int max_chain_len = 0;
+ int cur_bucket = 0;
+ struct sidtab_node *node;
+
+
+ hash_for_each(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, node, list) {
Safe for this to be entirely lock-free?
+ entries++;
+ if (i == cur_bucket) {
+ chain_len++;
+ if (chain_len == 1)
+ slots_used++;
+ } else {
+ cur_bucket = i;
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets "
+ "used, longest chain length %d\n", "context_to_sid",
+ entries, slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS,
+ max_chain_len);
Odd choice to pass "context_to_sid" as argument. And probably can avoid
the checkpatch.pl warning here too.
+}
+
static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
{
u32 capacity = SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
@@ -150,7 +207,7 @@ static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
if (sid != 0) {
if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
- context = sidtab_lookup(s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1));
+ context = sidtab_lookup(s, sid_to_index(sid));
else
context = sidtab_lookup_initial(s, sid);
if (context && (!context->len || force))
@@ -170,132 +227,70 @@ struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
}
-static int sidtab_find_context(union sidtab_entry_inner entry,
- u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
- struct context *context, u32 *index)
-{
- int rc;
- u32 i;
-
- if (level != 0) {
- struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
-
- i = 0;
- while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
- rc = sidtab_find_context(node->entries[i],
- pos, count, level - 1,
- context, index);
- if (rc == 0)
- return 0;
- i++;
- }
- } else {
- struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
-
- i = 0;
- while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
- if (context_cmp(&node->entries[i].context, context)) {
- *index = *pos;
- return 0;
- }
- (*pos)++;
- i++;
- }
- }
- return -ENOENT;
-}
-
-static void sidtab_rcache_update(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, u32 pos)
-{
- while (pos > 0) {
- WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[pos], READ_ONCE(s->rcache[pos - 1]));
- --pos;
- }
- WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[0], index);
-}
-
-static void sidtab_rcache_push(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
-{
- sidtab_rcache_update(s, index, SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE - 1);
-}
-
-static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
- u32 *index)
-{
- u32 i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++) {
- u32 v = READ_ONCE(s->rcache[i]);
-
- if (v >= SIDTAB_MAX)
- continue;
-
- if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, v, 0), context)) {
- sidtab_rcache_update(s, v, i);
- *index = v;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return -ENOENT;
-}
-
-static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
- u32 *index)
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
+ u32 *sid)
{
unsigned long flags;
- u32 count, count_locked, level, pos;
+ u32 count;
struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
struct context *dst, *dst_convert;
+ struct sidtab_node *dst_node, *dst_node_convert = NULL;
int rc;
- rc = sidtab_rcache_search(s, context, index);
- if (rc == 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* read entries only after reading count */
- count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
- level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
-
- pos = 0;
- rc = sidtab_find_context(s->roots[level], &pos, count, level,
- context, index);
- if (rc == 0) {
- sidtab_rcache_push(s, *index);
+ *sid = context_to_sid(s, context);
+ if (*sid)
return 0;
- }
/* lock-free search failed: lock, re-search, and insert if not found */
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ *sid = context_to_sid(s, context);
+ if (*sid)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
rc never set here, used in out_unlock path.
convert = s->convert;
- count_locked = s->count;
- level = sidtab_level_from_count(count_locked);
-
- /* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */
- while (count < count_locked) {
- if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 0), context)) {
- sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
- *index = count;
- rc = 0;
+ count = s->count;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst_node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sidtab_node), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!dst_node)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (convert) {
+ dst_node_convert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sidtab_node),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!dst_node_convert) {
+ kfree(dst_node);
goto out_unlock;
}
- ++count;
}
/* bail out if we already reached max entries */
rc = -EOVERFLOW;
- if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
+ if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX) {
+ kfree(dst_node);
+ kfree(dst_node_convert);
goto out_unlock;
+ }
/* insert context into new entry */
rc = -ENOMEM;
dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
- if (!dst)
+ if (!dst) {
+ kfree(dst_node);
+ kfree(dst_node_convert);
goto out_unlock;
+ }
Generally we'd introduce another goto target for these repeated
sequences of free calls. Just put it after the out_unlock sequence and
then it can jump back to out_unlock after the frees.
+
+ dst_node->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+ dst_node->context = dst;
rc = context_cpy(dst, context);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(dst_node);
+ kfree(dst_node_convert);
goto out_unlock;
+ }
/*
* if we are building a new sidtab, we need to convert the context
@@ -306,25 +301,35 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(convert->target, count, 1);
if (!dst_convert) {
context_destroy(dst);
+ kfree(dst_node);
+ kfree(dst_node_convert);
goto out_unlock;
}
rc = convert->func(context, dst_convert, convert->args);
if (rc) {
context_destroy(dst);
+ kfree(dst_node);
+ kfree(dst_node_convert);
goto out_unlock;
}
+ dst_node_convert->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+ dst_node_convert->context = dst_convert;
/* at this point we know the insert won't fail */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&convert->target->lock, flags);
convert->target->count = count + 1;
+ hash_add(convert->target->context_to_sid,
+ &dst_node_convert->list, dst_convert->hash);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&convert->target->lock, flags);
}
+ hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &dst_node->list, context->hash);
if (context->len)
pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
context->str);
- sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
- *index = count;
+ *sid = index_to_sid(count);
/* write entries before writing new count */
smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
@@ -335,27 +340,41 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
return rc;
}
-int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)
+static int sidtab_convert_hashnode(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
{
- int rc;
- u32 i;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct context *context;
+ struct sidtab_node *node;
- for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
- struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry = &s->isids[i];
+ context = sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
- if (entry->set && context_cmp(context, &entry->context)) {
- *sid = i + 1;
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sidtab_node), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!node)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- rc = sidtab_reverse_lookup(s, context, sid);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- *sid += SECINITSID_NUM + 1;
+ node->sid = index_to_sid(index);
+ node->context = context;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &node->list, context->hash);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
+static int sidtab_convert_hashtable(struct sidtab *s, u32 count)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ rc = sidtab_convert_hashnode(s, i);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc,
u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
@@ -400,6 +419,7 @@ static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
}
cond_resched();
}
+
return 0;
}
Avoid unrelated whitespace changes.
@@ -449,7 +469,16 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
s->convert = NULL;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = sidtab_convert_hashtable(params->target, count);
+ if (rc) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
}
+
return rc;
}
@@ -478,6 +507,19 @@ static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)
}
}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_hashtable(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ struct sidtab_node *node;
+ struct hlist_node *tmp;
+ int i;
+
+ hash_for_each_safe(s->context_to_sid, i, tmp, node, list) {
+ hash_del(&node->list);
+ kfree(node);
+ }
+}
+
void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
{
u32 i, level;
@@ -491,4 +533,5 @@ void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
--level;
sidtab_destroy_tree(s->roots[level], level);
+ sidtab_destroy_hashtable(s);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index 1f4763141aa1..85afef719a43 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
#include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include "context.h"
@@ -66,7 +67,16 @@ struct sidtab_convert_params {
struct sidtab *target;
};
-#define SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE 3
+struct sidtab_node {
+ u32 sid;
+ struct context *context;
+ struct hlist_node list;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 9
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define index_to_sid(index) (index + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
+#define sid_to_index(sid) (sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
struct sidtab {
/*
@@ -83,11 +93,11 @@ struct sidtab {
struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
spinlock_t lock;
- /* reverse lookup cache - access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() */
- u32 rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
-
/* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
+
+ /* Hash table for fast reverse context-to-sid lookups. */
+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(context_to_sid, SIDTAB_HASH_BITS);
};
int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
@@ -101,6 +111,8 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page);
+
#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
