> From: linux-sgx-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:linux-sgx- > owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Stephen Smalley > Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 1:48 PM > > On 6/21/19 12:54 PM, Xing, Cedric wrote: > >> From: Christopherson, Sean J > >> Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2019 3:24 PM > >> > >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index > >> 613a5c00e602..03951e08bdfc 100644 > >> --- a/security/security.c > >> +++ b/security/security.c > >> @@ -2359,3 +2359,10 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct > bpf_prog_aux *aux) > >> call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); > >> } > >> #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ > >> + > >> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_SGX > >> +int security_enclave_map(unsigned long prot) { > >> + return call_int_hook(enclave_map, 0, prot); } #endif /* > >> +CONFIG_INTEL_SGX */ > > > > Why is this new security_enclave_map() necessary while > security_mmap_file() will also be invoked? > > security_mmap_file() doesn't know about enclaves. It will just end up > checking FILE__READ, FILE__WRITE, and FILE__EXECUTE to /dev/sgx/enclave. > This was noted in the patch description. Surely I understand all those. As I mentioned in my other email, enclave_load() could indicate to LSM that a file is an enclave. Of course mmap() could be invoked before any pages are loaded so LSM wouldn't know at the first mmap(), but that doesn't matter as an empty enclave wouldn't post any threats anyway.
