On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 2:16 PM Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 12:20:45PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 11:01 AM Sean Christopherson > > <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 09:14:10AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > > Enclave file -- that is, the file backing the vma from which the data is loaded. > > > > > > It wasn't explicitly called out in Andy's proposal(s), but the idea is > > > that the SGX driver would effectively inherit permissions from the source > > > VMA (EADD needs a source for the initial value of the encave page). > > > > I actually meant for it to *not* work like this. I don't want the > > source VMA to have to be VM_EXEC. I think the LSM should just check > > permissions on ->vm_file. > > But if ->vm_file is NULL, i.e. the enclave is not backed by a file, > then PROCESS__EXECMEM is required (or more likely, ENCLAVE__EXECMEM). > If ->vm_file is NULL, then I think some privilege is needed. I suppose the policy could have a new lesser permission EXECUNTRUSTED which is like EXECMOD but you can't modify it. I'm not convinced this is particular important.
