> On May 24, 2019, at 10:07 AM, Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:43:27AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 12:24 AM Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> /** >>> * Summary: >>> * - The enclave file resembles a shared object that contains RO/RX/RW segments >>> * - FILE__* are assigned to /dev/sgx/enclave, to determine acceptable permissions to mmap()/mprotect(), valid combinations are >>> * + FILE__READ - Allow SGX1 enclaves only >>> * + FILE__READ|FILE__WRITE - Allow SGX2 enclaves to expand data segments (e.g. heaps, stacks, etc.) >> >> I think this is a non-starter :( FILE__WRITE also means that you can >> write to the file, and the admin / policy author will almost never >> want to allow that. > > Why would FILE__WRITE on /dev/sgx/enclave be a problem? An actual > write to /dev/sgx/enclave would yield -EINVAL, no? Bah, read it wrong — FILE__WRITE on the enclave file on disk is no good.
