On 4/19/2019 11:55 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
Prevent userspace from changing the the /proc/PID/attr values if the task's credentials are currently overriden. This not only makes sense conceptually, it also prevents some really bizarre error cases caused when trying to commit credentials to a task with overridden credentials. Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Reported-by: "chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
--- fs/proc/base.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index ddef482f1334..87ba007b86db 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2539,6 +2539,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, rcu_read_unlock(); return -EACCES; } + /* Prevent changes to overridden credentials. */ + if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return -EBUSY; + } rcu_read_unlock();if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
