On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 10:34 AM Yang Yingliang
<yangyingliang@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 2019/4/19 21:24, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 10:42 PM Yang Yingliang
> > <yangyingliang@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> On 2019/4/19 10:04, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:50 PM Yang Yingliang
> >>> <yangyingliang@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> On 2019/4/18 8:24, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>>>> On 4/17/2019 4:39 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>>>>> Since it looks like all three LSMs which implement the setprocattr
> >>>>>> hook are vulnerable I'm open to the idea that proc_pid_attr_write() is
> >>>>>> a better choice for the cred != read_cred check, but I would want to
> >>>>>> make sure John and Casey are okay with that.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> John?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Casey?
> >>>>> I'm fine with the change going into proc_pid_attr_write().
> >>>> The cred != real_cred checking is not enough.
> >>>>
> >>>> Consider this situation, when doing override, cred, real_cred and
> >>>> new_cred are all same:
> >>>>
> >>>> after override_creds() cred == real_cred == new1_cred
> >>> I'm sorry, you've lost me. After override_creds() returns
> >>> current->cred and current->real_cred are not going to be the same,
> >>> yes?
> >> It's possible the new cred is equal to current->real_cred and
> >> current->cred,
> >> so after overrides_creds(), they have the same value.
> > Both task_struct.cred and task_struct.real_cred are pointer values,
> > assuming that one uses prepare_creds() to allocate/initialize a new
> > cred struct for use with override_creds() then the newly created cred
> > should never be equal to task_struct.real_cred. Am I missing
> > something, or are you thinking of something else?
>
> In do_acct_process(), file->f_cred may equal to current->real_cred, I
> confirm
> it by adding some debug message in do_acct_process() like this:
I would expect that; real_cred is the task's objective DAC
credentials, so using it for f_cred makes sense.
What we are now talking about is the task's subjective credentials,
which can be overridden via override_creds(), and are what the LSMs
change via proc_pid_attr_write().
> --- a/kernel/acct.c
> +++ b/kernel/acct.c
> @@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct
> *acct)
> flim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
> current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
> /* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled
> accounting */
> + pr_info("task:%px new cred:%px real cred:%px cred:%px\n",
> current, file->f_cred, current->real_cred, current->cred);
> orig_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
