On 2/15/19 2:21 PM, Dominick Grift wrote:
Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 12:24 PM Dominick Grift <dac.override@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Dominick Grift <dac.override@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
On 2/15/19 10:25 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 2/15/19 10:05 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 2/15/19 10:03 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
On 2/15/19 10:00 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 9:51 AM Stephen Smalley
<sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Add basic MLS policy support to mdp. Declares
two sensitivities and two categories, defines
mls constraints for all permissions requiring
dominance (ala MCS), assigns the system-high
level to initial SID contexts and the default user
level, and assigns system-low level to filesystems.
Also reworks the fs_use and genfscon rules to only
generate rules for filesystems that are configured
in the kernel. In some cases this depends on a specific
config option for security xattrs, in other cases security
xattrs are unconditionally supported by a given filesystem
if the filesystem is enabled, and in some cases the filesystem
is always enabled in the kernel. Dropped obsolete pseudo
filesystems.
NB The list of fs_use_* and genfscon rules emitted by mdp
is very incomplete compared to refpolicy or Android sepolicy.
We should probably expand it.
Usage:
scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp -m policy.conf file_contexts
checkpolicy -M -o policy policy.conf
Then install the resulting policy and file_contexts as usual.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v3 fixes up the file contexts generation code to also use
SYSTEMLOW and
collapse down to a single fprintf call per line.
scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c | 131
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
This is great Stephen, thanks for working on this - and rather quickly
too! For those who don't follow the GitHub issues, I just opened an
issue yesterday mentioning it would be nice to add MLS support to the
mdp tool.
Are you planning to keep playing with this? I'm asking not because I
think it needs more work to be worthwhile, but rather I don't want to
merge something that you want to continue working on. If you are
happy with this latest patch I think it is okay to merge this into
selinux/next, even at this late stage, simply because it is not part
of a built kernel, but rather a developer's tool.
No, I think I'm done for now unless you find a problem with
it. Absent some compelling use case for mdp it is hard to justify
spending any more time on it.
Note however that the instructions in
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SELinux.rst just say to run
scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh and since that doesn't pass -m to
mdp or -M to checkpolicy, no one will use this support unless they
do it all by hand.
FWIW, a Fedora system wouldn't come up cleanly with this policy.
Partly appears to be due to systemd having embedded security
contexts specific to Fedora/refpolicy into its own configurations
and partly due to MLS denials. I don't even know if it would work
before this change though...
Couldn't seem to get a mdp-generated policy to boot on Fedora even in
permissive, before or after this change. I assume it has to do with
leaking of contexts outside of the policy and/or missing config files
from the dummy policy (e.g. /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/ has
systemd_contexts and other userspace config files that don't exist in
the mdp policy). More evidence of the irrelevance of mdp...
Oh, right you need a "dbus_contexts" file probably. DBUS refuses to
start without it, and these day's without dbus no system
My dssp2-minimal [1] policy is my alternative to mdp.
https://github.com/DefenSec/dssp2-minimal
It is not quite as simple as mpd but it think it is decent balance
between having something useful and still easy to read.
While dssp2-minimal is much smaller than reference policy, it's still
an order of magnitude larger than the mdp generated policy. I'm not
sure if this is something you care about, but if you wanted to work on
getting mdp to the point where it would allow a Fedora system (or any
modern SELinux based system for that matter) to boot, that could be
useful, even if I'm not convinced it needs to be a priority at the
moment.
It is also an order of magnitude more useful than mdp.
I suppose I could look at what it would take to get it to boot on some
rainy afternoon. Should not be hard, but i hesitate to polute mdp with
user space access vectors. It feels like setting a precendent somehow.
In theory, if using selinux_check_access() to check permissions and if
the policy sets allow_unknown=true, then the absence of the userspace
classes and access vectors should just cause all userspace permission
checks to pass.
Of course, not all userspace object managers use selinux_check_access(),
and may not check security_deny_unknown() directly.
Besides, haven't you always wanted to get a patch accepted into the
kernel Dominick? ;)
Not particularly, no.
