On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 9:36 AM Dominick Grift <dac.override@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 09:57:20AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 09/12/2018 09:26 AM, Ted Toth wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 8:04 AM Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <mailto:sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
> >
> > On 09/11/2018 04:59 PM, Ted Toth wrote:
> > > That's awesome and now it's got me thinking about other
> > > classes/permissions that we could implement. Can cil macros can be
> > > referenced in .te/.if files?
> >
> > Not sure I understand your question. You can't directly embed cil
> > statements in .te/.if files. However, if you define a class/permission
> > in a .cil module, you can certainly specify a require on it and use it
> > from a conventional .te/.if module, ala:
> > $ cat > usemcstrans.te <<EOF
> > policy_module(usemcstrans, 1.0)
> >
> > require {
> > class mcstrans { color_use };
> > attribute domain;
> > }
> >
> > allow domain self:mcstrans color_use;
> > EOF
> >
> > $ make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile usemcstrans.pp
> > $ sudo semodule -i usemcstrans.pp
> >
> >
> > If the cil contained:
> >
> > (macro use_color (type caller) (allow caller self mcstrans (color_use)))
> >
> > then in x.te can I use the macro:
> >
> > type x_t;
> > use_color(x_t)
>
> Sorry, no. The macros used in .te/.if files are just m4 definitions handled
> at the preprocessing stage, not a feature of the module language. The CIL
> macros are directly supported by the CIL compiler, but they won't be visible
> to the module compiler. Also, you are missing several parentheses above
> (I'm not fond of the lisp-like syntax myself). In a CIL module, I think the
> correct syntax would be:
>
> (macro use_color ((type caller)) (allow caller self (mcstrans (color_use))))
>
> (call use_color(x_t))
>
> Or you could define a m4 macro in an .if file and use that in a .te file.
> Or both.
>
Ideally you would have all of your policy written in CIL or in a high-level language that was designed to leverage CIL.
Unfortunately I/we don't live in an ideal world :( but thanks for the pointers.
My DSSP2 policy is a CIL-only policy. In there I also leverage unordered classes, Meaning that for example if you remove or disable the mcstrans module then you automatically also remove or disable the access vectors that mcstrans manages.
minimal:
https://github.com/DefenSec/dssp2-minimal
standard (my personal policy based on top of minimal):
https://github.com/DefenSec/dssp2-standard/commits/master
DSSP2 does not support enforcement of confidentiality though
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Dominick Grift
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